Re: [Fis] The Identity of Ethics

Re: [Fis] The Identity of Ethics

From: Stanley N. Salthe <[email protected]>
Date: Fri 28 Apr 2006 - 18:33:37 CEST

Reacting to Carl's complex contribution, I wish only to comment upon the
nature of "identity". One approach is to construct uniqueness as the
nexus, or intersection, of many properties. For example, in my case we
would have: elderly, Caucasian, male, intellectual, academic, naturalist,
birder, biologist, systems scientist, semiotician, slight build, middle
class, gardener, collector, artist, (ex)poet, Romantic, North American,
English speaking -- am I there yet? I seem to recede before these
attributes, getting smaller and smaller as the intersection of all of
these. I don't think I can find my ontological individual identity, or
ethical integrity, or political authenticity, as such, in the ever
diminishing, increasingly constrained opening in this verbal net. Yet
there seems to be no way to transcend these conceptual qualifications.

STAN

>Unsolved question
>The identity question has been addressed by Wittgenstein, as he mused "what
>is identity? If a thing is the same as an other thing then they are not two
>things." - but here he left off. So, the question of identity of whatever
>(in this our discussion, presently, ethics) is rather unsolved as such.
>Sets of references
>The main point with identity, and with ethics, too, appears to be that we
>compare an expected set of values to an observed set of values. We compare
>remembered values to observed values. We remember how it should be and we
>see how it is. We end up with a set of transcendence and a set of reality.
>Between these two we continuously compare.
>Ethics to moral : autoregulation to heteroregulation
>The polarisation is also known as egotistic and altruistic motivation. A
>system optimising its own pleasure will behave in a maximally ethical way, a
>system optimising the wishes of others will behave in a maximally moral way;
>ethics being the system of congruences between inner expectations and
>(self-)observed behaviour, moral being the system of congruences between
>externally expected roles and (self-)observed behaviour.
>Overoptimisation
>If one behaves exclusively self-optimising, one will lose the group's
>respect. If one behaves exclusively servile, one loses the self-respect.
>Usual range
>We implicitly expect among each other to behave in a moderate,
>middle-of-the-road, common-sense way. We agree about quite many ranges of
>optimal, usual, preferred, normal, reasonable extents, even if we do not
>take the time to enumerate them.
>Proposal
>Let us get down to the hard rock solid foundation of what is usual, normal,
>frequent, ordinary in the world. The same numeric functions govern our
>interpersonal (and intrapersonal) proceedings, too. We agree about the usual
>extent of variability in a group. We know if it is getting too boring and we
>know if it is too abrupt, unconnected, conflictuous - not uniformly
>neighboured the steps.
>Variability, freedom and identity
>We discuss predictions and extents of variability. We predict the behaviour
>of a person and compare it to a usual range just like we predict the
>position of a DNA marker and compare the extent of changes we expect to
>generate by this marker (as opposed to a different marker on the same
>place).
>Basis of predictions
>We use (in our brain and in our system) a duality which roots in the
>similarity and the difference of the things the world is made up of. Our
>conscious thinking has been drilled to observe and take into account the
>similarity property of the things the world is made up of. The other set of
>values we operate on is the background, relative to which we observe the
>similarities. We do not discuss the properties of the background because we
>do not notice it, it being the background.
>Dissimilarity property
>I wish for an elementary school math book where not only 1+1=2 is given as
>an axiom and a rule but also 1 # 2 # 3 ... as well. If the next generation
>grows up by learning to observe the dissimilarity (as a countable property)
>of things and of concepts, as legitimate and fruitful as the similarity
>property, then we shall be able to understand the concept of identity.
>Ethical and observed behaviour
>These both are frequency distributions. If a behaviour agrees to the dot to
>the other, we have identity (between expectation and observation). The main
>point is too trivial to be noticed: that we have TWO sets of references
>which are somehow connected. The same rules govern the interplay between any
>TWO sets of references, be it physics, chemistry, economics, genetics or
>interpersonal communications. There is always a set of expectations
>("Sollwert") against which a second set of values ("Istwert") gets compared.
>Forces and predictions
>A rigorous translation of everything and all into probability extents opens
>up nice new ways of looking at, e.g., forces. Gravitation is specifically a
>prediction about a place. In human behaviour, we also predict the behaviour
>table and measure the force of the urge on that, how predictably we
>encounter an element of the repertoire.
>Karl
>
>
>
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Received on Fri Apr 28 16:44:13 2006


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