Dear Michael, JohnH, Pedro, John C and List:
The recent posts activated several long-simmering views on the issue
of quantum theory and information as an exact science.
I will attempt to specify the issues that are of concern to the
chemical, biological and medical sciences.
1. Grammar.
It appears to me that the conflation of grammatical concepts with
mathematical concepts lie at the root of J. Barwise's notion of
information.
The argument is as follows:
A. I argue that the concept of a mathematical function is
intrinsically a causal connection between the domain and the
codomain (range).
B. The necessity for a matching of points (intervals) of every object
in the domain to a specific point (range) in the codomain is deemed
to be indistinguishable from a causal relationship.
C. Further, one can argue that the specification of the particular
function is a specification of particular information.
D. By extension, the mathematical formalism of information theory
requires the composition of multiple functions in order to transmit
information from the sender and to the receiver.
E. By necessity, the grammar of mathematical functions used to
transmit information is imperative.
F. Shannon's view of information TRANSFER allows for the one function
to be statistical in nature (noise) and thereby introduces the
notions of contingency into the engineering of the system.
G. The pseudo statistical nature of quantum theory is intrinsically
(functionally) different from the usual mathematics of statistical
distributions. (For example, in addition to the special functional
forms of QM, how does one untangle the dynamics of mathematical
quantum "knots" using statistics?)
H. I can not draw a general conclusion that the logic of quantum
information is computable. Can anyone else draw such a general
conclusion? In other words, is quantum information / computation a
rare phenomena restricted to certain highly specific circumstances?
G. In other words, is it possible that the logic of quantum mechanics
is not grammatically imperative?
2. Material causality
It appears to me that the Landauer's argument is merely "physics
talk" that is a self filling prophecy.
The quote of Michel:
>> In his words, "Information is not a disembodied abstract entity;
>> it is always tied to a physical representation. It is represented
>> by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a charge, a hole in a
>> punched card, a mark on paper, or some other equivalent. This ties
>> the handling of information to all the possibilities and
>> restrictions of our real physical world, its laws of physics, and
>> its storehouse of available parts." (Physics Letters A 217,
1996,
>> p. 188.)
But what is physical thought?
Most would agree that physical thought is intimately intertwined,
interwoven and interlaced with mathematics. Some might say that
physics is merely applied mathematics, that it lacks any self
standing domain.
Consequently, as mathematics is often deemed as abstraction,
mathematical information is often deemed as abstract.
It appears to me that physicists often seek to treat matter itself as
>> a disembodied abstract entity;
so what lies at the roots of Landauer's position other than a very
weakly justified negation of the term "information" as a concept that
lacks a definitive definition.
Landauer's claim:
>> it is always tied to a physical representation.
is not to be taken seriously, unless one starts with the premise that
only the physical representation can exist.
Then, of course, the claim becomes a tautology.
In fact, we do not have exact physical representations of most of
chemistry, biology and medicine and I am skeptical that the theories
of (space time energy) have the power to capture the essential nature
of matter as it exhibits itself in chemistry, biology and medicine.
Landauer's assertion that:
>> This ties the handling of information to all the possibilities and
>> restrictions of our real physical world, its laws of physics, and
>> its storehouse of available parts." (Physics Letters A 217,
1996,
>> p. 188.)
is also not to be taken seriously from a mathematical perspective.
For example, the relatively "simple" problem (from a complexity
perspective) of counting the number of chemical isomers remains
unapproachable from a physical perspective. Why? Perhaps, because
the language of physics is grounded in concepts of the point, the
line and the plane. The isomer problem is a spatial problem that
appears to be beyond the scope of the mechanics of dimensionality
theory. Consequently, the Landauer claim of "all the possibilities"
is not correct, it is not justified, and it is simply without a
scientific or mathematical basis.
3. Philosophic plasticity
From my perspective, man is intrinsically part of nature and has
emerged from nature. Human communication, an integral aspect of
being human, uses many different symbol systems to express the
richness of our individual natures, not merely mathematical symbols.
In particular I note that chemical symbols are antecedent to
artificial mathematical symbols. Intrinsic to the usage of chemical
symbols as information carriers are the concepts of number and
relation as illustrated by the "proof of structure" for such
molecules as DNA. The intertwining, interlacing and interweaving of
chemical symbols within the "proof of structure" concept creates both
a realistic and consistent basis for creating an abstract theory of
the material world, including the transmission of information by
human beings. Thus, the chemical sciences must be used as "gold
standard" for expressing the natural concepts that embody the
complexity of information in a CONSISTENT manner.
It appears to me that the physical community seeks to invoke a
material world, a realistic position when it is useful to do so, for
example, when seeking to explain empirical observations, such as
spectra analysis.
Concomitantly, mathematical abstractions are invoked as if the
abstractions themselves are the reality of the world when it is
useful to do so.
While I admire the agility of the physical mindset, I question its
realism and its consistency in matching the theory with the practice
as is necessary in the "proof of structure" concept of chemistry /
biochemistry information.
4. Closure
From my perspective, as an outsider to the physical community but
with a professional interest as a "stakeholder" in the scientific
community, I am utter confused by the lack of mathematical coherence
in the ongoing discussion of "quantum information" as outlined in the
opening paragraphs.
I hope that someone who understand both mathematics and physics far
better than I will write a coherent summary of this topic for FIS
members.
Cheers to All.
Jerry
On Jul 20, 2006, at 6:00 AM, fis-request@listas.unizar.es wrote:
> Dear John and colleagues,
>
> I would add a couple of motifs to your cogent reflections.
>
> On causation, I do not quite see that the Aristotelian categories
> adequately cover the "pristine" info causation we see for
instance
> in living beings-- as I have often argued they lack any stable
> form, always engaged in creation / annihilation processes. At
> least, three types of info are at work there molecularly
> (structural "dilute", generative "sequential",
communicational
> "signaling pathways"), together incessantly handling and
revamping
> and adapting the "form" to the environmental demands. Perhaps
as I
> have pointed out during recent discussions here, an overall notion
> of information "as a distinction on the adjacent" might apply
to
> all of them. It would bring some easy-going thought about that.
> About extending this vision on "info causation" towards
neuronal
> and social-economic realms, it does not look uncanny, particularly
> regarding the adaptability of companies to the information received
> (and not "forces"!) from markets. Unfortunately, staunch
> mechanistic visions prevail in most of those quarters.
>
> Thus, the strict separation of physical information from physical
> laws themselves (or "informational laws" for Andrei-- which I
> prefer) may be another stumbling block. I do not have any further
> hint about that, but I see it as a serious problem for any
> information physics approach that really attempts a renovation and
> a cohesion of ideas. My only guess is what I already mentioned
> about elementary Planck cells in string theory and Kalabi-Yau
> spaces, plus all those singularities about information recently
> discussed on black holes by Hawkins, Penrose and others.
>
> Igor's conceptual solution of information as a fundamental category
> is a very interesting temptation... Maybe we should restrict our
> visions to those strategic areas where un-satisfaction and unrest
> with information-surrogates is a fact.
>
> best regrds
>
> Pedro
>
>
>
> At 11:20 19/07/2006, you wrote:
>> Quoting Michael Devereux <dbar_x@cybermesa.com>:
>>
>> Dear Michael,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> <So, according to Landauer, and many scientists who have read his
>> work, the
>> <correspondence of information with the experienced, physical
>> world is
>> definite.
>>
>> We had a brief side conversation about this last year.
>>
>> Landauer did define information (data)as a physical but also a
>> 'slippery'
>> experience and pretty convincingly set about proving it. That
>> uncertain
>> 'slipperiness' takes us into QI and probability theory -
>> information as
>> unexpected variety within a constraint (in scientific and in
>> aesthetic
>> experience).
>>
>> Is the commodification of information not similar to the
>> mechanisation of
>> time as a physical clock in the eighteenth and nineteenth century -
>> till Messieurs Heidegger and Einstein came along? Likewise before
>> Humboldt
>> the phenomenon of language was simply nominalist marks describing
>> objects.
>>
>> From another perspective matter is form with an address (form-at) and
>> form yields shape pattern and matter (in science and art).
>> Lanadauer's
>> in-format-ion corresponds to Aristotle's first - material - cause
>> "that o
>> ut of
>> which a thing comes to be, and which persists," and represents
>> marked dat
>> a,
>> documents, hardware/software etc. X is what Y is made out of.
>>
>> John Collier's recent attempts to base 'information' on formal
>> causation
>> and symmetry breaking tend to address the second - formal - cause
>> the statement
>> of essence (X is what it is to be Y). [in-form-ation]. Von
>> Weiszacker and L
>> yre
>> 's pragmatic school found information on the efficient cause
>> (X produces Y) [in-formation] Paninformationists (like Norbert
>> Wiener) who deny
>> the materialist basis of information tend to describe the final cause
>> (X is what Y is for) [in-for-mation].
>>
>> If we can ground our concepts of information on Aristotelian
>> causation
>> IS may no longer be the pseudo-science it is today.
>>
>> In this sense the 'difference that MAKES a difference' can be
>> based on
>> Aristotle's cause (aitos) (what makes information intrinsically
>> information
>> )
>> (AITOS = make).
>>
>> The relationship between the phenomenon information and the
>> material world
>> is what information science is yet to discover.
>>
>> That split between 'informatio sensis' and 'informatio intellectus
>> possibil
>> is'
>> (informationem de voluntate et meditationem de potestate nexu
>> individuo
>> commiscens et copulans) which occurred in Bacon's Novum Organum
>> still continues today in rival material/nonmaterial or realist/
>> antirealist
>> information theories.
>>
>> In a quantum sense both are wrong and both are right at the same
>> time.
>>
>> Sincerely
>>
>> John H
>>
>>
>>> Dear Andrei, John, and colleagues,
>>>
>>> The relationship between information and the material world was
>>> correctly described, I believe, some ten years ago, by Rolf
>>> Landauer, the chief scientist at the IBM Watson laboratory in New
>>> York. In several seminal papers he insisted that all information
>>> is physical. In his words, "Information is not a disembodied
>>> abstract entity; it is always tied to a physical representation.
>>> It is represented by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a
>>> charge, a hole in a punched card, a mark on paper, or some other
>>> equivalent. This ties the handling of information to all the
>>> possibilities and restrictions of our real physical world, its
>>> laws of physics, and its storehouse of available parts."
(Physics
>>> Letters A 217, 1996, p. 188.)
>>> When information is exchanged between two objects, as in a
>>> measurement, there is, necessarily, a transfer of some physical
>>> thing. I would note that all physical objects are composed of
>>> quanta and all quanta carry energy. So, according to Landauer,
>>> and many scientists who have read his work, the correspondence of
>>> information with the experienced, physical world is definite.
>>> Cordially,
>>>
>>> Michael Devereux
Jerry LR Chandler
Research Professor
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study
George Mason University
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Received on Thu Jul 20 16:50:00 2006
