Dear Michael:
Your post is surprising close to my own view, but we are using the
words differently.
(I should note that I was in a playful mood when I used the term
"trinitarian physics". The triad of "space time energy" is so often
abused in the philosophy of science literature that a use of a
metaphor with religious doctrine seemed appropriate.)
With regard to the term "physical objects", what does it mean to you?
If all things are "physical objects", then certainly this "Schoolman"
philosophy imputes that all concrete information is physical. very
simple deduction; no need for discussion. I presuppose that this is
your usage. But, as you write in your post, this view of "physical
objects" is no longer accepted. String theory, as I understand it,
is merely mathematics, untestable by experiment. I would be
delighted if someone could point me to experiments designed to test
string theory.
If all things are chemical objects, then all concrete information is
chemical. But, as you write in the example in your post, a chemical
object, is the SOURCE of study of physical objects. And, as you are
well aware, the logic of chemical structures is based on the atomic
numbers. These atomic numbers are the natural origins of the
mathematical number systems from which physical thought is derived.
This is what I mean by foundational.
I provide explicit comments within your post.
On Jul 25, 2006, at 6:01 AM, fis-request@listas.unizar.es wrote:
> From: Michael Devereux <dbar_x@cybermesa.com>
> Date: July 24, 2006 10:36:41 PM EDT
> To: FIS Mailing List <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Subject: [Fis] Physical information.
>
>
> Dear Colleagues,
>
> I understand Landauer�s insight not as an analysis of the logical
> structure of information, nor of its ubiquitous utility throughout
> human endeavors, but rather as a more precise description of the
> mechanisms for storage and transmission of information.
What are you seeking to express?
If the concept of information is an independent concept, a
foundational concept, a concept from which other concepts are
derived, then why drag in notions of storage and transmission?
I suggest your sentence suggests a tacit recognition that of the
system science perspective of communication of encoded information,
otherwise, the precise description of information lacks meaning, does
it not?
> According to Landauer, and I think he was right about this,
> information is exclusively stored in the configuration of physical
> objects,.and transmitted only by material entities. So, for
> example, the energy configuration of a simple bi-level atom would
> contain a single bit of information, represented by zero, say, in
> its ground configuration, and by one in its excited level. Of
> course the physical configuration of the atom�s nucleus, made up of
> protons and neutrons, must also contain additional information,
> ignored in this instance. And we know that protons and neutrons are
> themselves composed of quarks, whose physical configuration must
> also contain more information. And, as far as we know, those quarks
> may be constituted by some structure of strings, with even more
> information, and so on.
I concur with the possibility of mathematical projections from
"strings". But, by using this argument you are in effect agreeing
with my position. That modern physics (not 19 th Century physics) is
effectively applied mathematics.
In order to compose your narrative, it is necessary to re-define the
concept of a bit from the context of a message and a communication
between a sender and a receiver. In place of a bit as a unit of
communication, the narrative moves into abstractions of abstractions,
in other words, mathematics. In doing so, the context of the term
"bit" as a unit of encoded communication between sender and receiver
disappears; the meaning is lost and the ability to decipher the
message is lost.
> I also understand Landauer to tell us that information is
> transmitted from one thing to another only by physical objects, all
> of which are composed of energetic quanta. As, for instance,
> sending information on a telegraph line by a series of electrical
> impulses, each of which contains many electrons. I know of no
> reason to suppose that the information any person holds and
> exploits, even about mathematics, is not stored and transmitted
> physically, as Landauer has said.
I respond with a simple question:
Is the information content of DNA a physical form of information?
If so, can you construct a narrative that reveals how this
information is encoded from physical principles?
> Jerry wrote that �mathematics is often deemed as abstraction, (so)
> mathematical information is often deemed as abstract.� But, it is
> the brain cells and synaptic connections, their chemical and
> electrical configuration and signal processing, which alone permits
> us to employ mathematics.
Hmmmm, a curious view.
Does this mean that the sperm and egg of our parents contain
mathematics?
Or, is mathematics one of several abstract symbol systems emerging
from human cultural activities and human communication?
> Clearly, traumatic injury to the brain (or death, even) can destroy
> a person�s mathematical facility. I suppose neuroscientists today
> may even be able to locate those specific areas of the brain that
> process mathematical thoughts.
The switch between local and global arguments is fascinating.
> I would say that those who might claim that physics is merely
> applied mathematics, that it lacks any self standing domain, are
> certainly mistaken.
Why? Is it your philosophy of physics that it is a self standing
domain that merely invokes mathematics when needed to solve problems?
In one physical philosophy, all the universal is connected by fields
such that the notion of "self standing domain" is itself without ground.
> Those of us who are physical scientists recognize that our models
> of the physical world must always be validated by tangible
> observations in controlled experiments.
Always? I have followed the theories of astronomy / cosmology for
several decades.
Would you make an exception for these folks, who can not re-set the
clock and circumstances at will?
> That, I believe, distinguishes the physical sciences from pure
> mathematics.
The issue is not merely distinction. I concur with you that the
distinction is easy to make. The issue is one of foundations, of
sources, of beginnings, or origins, or "ur..." Perhaps we are
talking past one another?
> I have yet to meet the chemist, biologist, geologist,
> paleontologist, astronomer, or physicist who seeks to treat matter
> itself as a disembodied abstract entity.
JLRC:
> I recommend to you A. N. Whitehead, "Process and Reality". I
just
> returned from the Whitehead conference in Salzburg. (The program
> is on the web.) My impression was that I was one of the few
> presenters in the chemistry and biology sections that DID NOT seek
> to treat matter "as a disembodied abstract entity." but rather
as
> discrete particles with specific identities that can be reified.
MD:
> Landauer certainly didn�t do that, and the rest of us, also, I
> believe, clearly see the difference between a mathematical model of
> the physical world, and the world itself. Because we carefully
> observe that world in our experiments.
Again, the issue is about foundations. For more than 15 years, I
observed experiments on roughly a daily basis.
Such experimental observations must be local and focal, circumscribed
by circumstances that one can control. The foundation of
experimental works is always reproducibility. Can we reproduce the
same results tomorrow as we did today?
The foundational issues are not local and focal. The foundational
issues are always of the nature of extension and intention.
If fact "x" is true locally, how can a global conclusion be
inferred? Or imputed? Or computed?
Rene Thom was very direct about this problem in his various works.
Attempts to infer global conclusion from local relations are popular
sport in the several communities that are concerned with eternal
questions.
Frankly, I remain a skeptic on such matters.
Cheers
Jerry
PS: The recent book: "Re-discovering Physics" by the Nobel Laurate
Robert Laughlin (fractional Hall effect) gives a physical
justification for many of the positions I have taken and relied upon
chemical arguments. By the way, he argues against the plausibility
of quantum computing as a practical technology...
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Received on Thu Jul 27 21:35:43 2006
