Dear Michael and List:
I am departing on an extended trip and will not be able to continue
this conversation. A few hurried comments are inserted in your post.
On Jul 31, 2006, at 6:00 AM, fis-request@listas.unizar.es wrote:
> 1. Physical Objects (Michael Devereux)
>
>
>
> From: Michael Devereux <dbar_x@cybermesa.com>
> Date: July 31, 2006 1:55:35 AM EDT
> To: FIS Mailing List <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Subject: [Fis] Physical Objects
>
>
> Dear Jerry, John H., and colleagues,
>
> I�m convinced that the traditional, long-established argument for
> the existence of physical, material (chemical) objects, clearly
> distinguished from our purely mental concepts, remains the valid one.
So am I. I concur.
But, I am also convinced that the LOGIC of the chemical sciences is
radically different from the logic of the physical sciences. Have
you ever considered this possibility?
We make no progress if conflate the one logical structure for
another. For example, the atomic numbers are indivisible. The
physical concept of mass is a divisible variable. What foundational
issue is at stake on the distinction between divisible and indivisible?
> No sensible person would willingly step in front of a speeding
> automobile, because it might be a very painful experience. Physical
> objects have effects on our senses - we can feel them. (Or see,
> hear, smell, or taste them.
We smell and taste chemical objects. Molecules.
Chemical theory provides direct evidence for relationships between
smell and molecular structure. The concepts of mass, position,
force, etc are not "smelled" or "tasted"; these are amorphous
continuous variables, not discrete chemical structures.
> And, we observe them in experiments.) Obviously, that�s not the
> case with a mathematical concept like five, or, for instance,
> numerical equality. No one has ever been hurt wrangling an integer.
> So, I do not believe that physical objects are all that exists.
> And, physical scientists, as distinct from pure mathematicians,
> say, do invariably rely on tangible, controlled, reproducible
> experiments to establish the scientific validity of our
> descriptions of the material world.
Many mathematicians are deeply involved in designing experiments to
valid theories.
The issue is the logical structure, the conceptual structure, the
sources of structure, the origin of properties, the beginning of the
foundations of matter as it relates to logical sentences that
correspond EXACTLY with reality.
> The physicist, and nobel laureate, Sheldon Glashow, has ardently
> emphasized that string theory, while popularly promulgated, and
> intriguing, is not established science until it is experimentally
> confirmed. I�ve heard proposals for string experiments which would
> require machines operating at very high energies. We may recall
> that the quark theory was only confirmed after construction of the
> high energy Stanford linear accelerator. Other machines have
> reproduced those experiments, and reconfirmed that description of
> nature.
> I don�t believe I�ve yet heard an accepted, precise description of
> information. Still, I�m sure that, as Landauer taught us, all
> information is transported and stored in material objects. I also
> understand that it was Szilard, (Zeitschrift fur Physik, 53, 1929,
> p. 840, english translation in Maxwell�s Demon: Entropy,
> Information, Computing, Princeton U. Press, 1992, p. 124.) who
> introduced, and exampled in a thermodynamic engine of gas
> molecules, the information bit.
If one ignores the issues of encoding and decoding information, one
has wide choices of narratives to describe information. Is a "bit"
of information merely using the term "sign" as information or is part
of communication between a sender and a receiver?
If one insists that information is transmitted as an encoding and
uncoded or recoded after the transmission, one has to work a bit
harder. It appears to me that Landauer prefers to use the notion of
"sign" as information.
> Information, as I understand it, is stored via the particular
> physical arrangement of the four basic protein molecules of DNA.
Well, I am not certain how to understand this perspective. I presume
that this is a categorical error but I am not certain.
> I take it that information transmission is an �event�, as John H.,
> Stanley, and Rafael suggest, in agreement with at least one
> definition physicists use for that term. We name certain energy
> exchanges. as, for example, the annihilation of an electron and
> positron to create two electromagnetic photons, an annihilation-
> creation event, appropriately described by a quantum mechanical
> operator.
Hmmmm. Well, perhaps we do not use the term "event" in the same
sense. My usage is an event is without the concept of duration. A
process includes intrinsically the concept of duration.
> And, I�ve argued that information is carried in the configuration
> of physical objects, which also determines the energy of that
> physical system. Thus, information transfer would also transmit
> energy, a physical event. I don�t find any implication, however,
> that the concept of information is, itself, physical.
> Cordially,
>
> Michael Devereux
I am curious that no one has responded to the issue of a "Gold
Standard" for information. I am certain that QM offers some
reasonable alternatives. What are they?
Cheers
Jerry
Jerry LR Chandler
Research Professor
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study
George Mason University
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Received on Thu Aug 3 21:29:20 2006
