Dear Arne,
I count myself as a realist and, to paraphrase your statement, I see any
reason in what you wrote to convert me. Your points about limitations and
biases of the mind regarding our understanding of reality are good ones, and
I think it is important for realists to keep these cautions in mind.
However, your position seems to be that the one thing we can know exists is
the mind itself. I see this as a useful proposition in the scientific study
of brain function and mental phenomena, but I don't see how it can permit
science to study anything else. If we don't start with the premise that
there is a reality to study, and which can be understood in some way, it
would seem that science (other than a science of mind) would have no
validity. In my view, science has demonstrated plenty of validity (e.g.,
modern technology), and I don't see how this could have been achieved if a
coherent reality did not exist or if science was not sufficiently effective
at revealing aspects of reality. Therefore, I think that the realists
perspective has proven itself. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to
learn about the ways our minds can mislead us within the context of science.
It would be even more fantastic to learn about particular limitations of our
minds that might prevent us from understanding aspects of reality that might
exist, if it is possible to learn such a thing.
Regards,
Guy Hoelzer
on 11/8/06 1:28 AM, Arne Kjellman at kjellman@dsv.su.se wrote:
> Dear Karl and FIS-collegues,
>
>
>
> Yes Karl, in spite of your touch of scorn, I can see 'things' but
contrary
> to realists I (like Bohr and Feynman and many others) don't place the
'thing'
> of my perception into some obscure reality endowed with some magic
> properties like "objectivity" or "accessibility on equal
terms" like some
> imaginary world of Platonian ideas. We place this concept where it occurs
-
> namely IN OUR MINDS. And this is the deciding difference between the
realist
> and constructivist (or antirealist if you prefer). And as I have told you
> before - unless you can resolve the REALIST'S DILEMMA I can see no sound
> reason for me converting to realism - and neither for you being one, no
> matter how many mantras you are able to produce.
>
>
>
> There is something most annoying in the realist's efforts to run away
from
> the realist's dilemma (the silence is total) - I mean after all almost
> everybody can understand that a physicist using a measuring instrument he
> doesn't understand (lacks a model of) cannot understand the status of the
> entities or phenomena he is measuring. When he claims these entities to
be
> the "things" of a common world he, to my mind, simply admits he
doesn't
> understand the "worldly things." So what is then the point of
discussing man's
> eventual reception of "information" from such unknown worlds?
All we know
> then is its scientific name - reality. And this parallels the way other
> believers use the word God. When saying so I do not say we are not
entitled
> to believe in a God, Evolution or reality - or that it might be something
> like this beyond human reason. Not at all - I simply say that that
certain
> knowledge in these questions is beyond human knowing and doesn't belong
to
> science. "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be
silent"::
> Wittgenstein.
>
>
>
> Therefore we have better discuss WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT - our impressions and
> personal experience and do so carefully. So please help me instead to
> clarify the realist's dilemma because I think such a discussion could
> resolve the realist/antirealist controversy and provide a useful step
> towards the understanding of information.
>
>
>
> Best Arne
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Karl Javorszky" <karl.javorszky@chello.at>
> To: "'Stanley N. Salthe (by way of Pedro
Marijuan<marijuan@unizar.es>)'"
> <ssalthe@binghamton.edu>; <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 4:04 PM
> Subject: [Fis] genetics: the most outstanding problem, SOLVED
>
>
>> Dear Stan,
>>
>> In your last posting, you said:
>>> SS: Of course, the origin of the genetic system is arguably the
most
>>> outstanding problem facing natural science. It seems that, other
than
>>> the
>>> (to me) unconvincing RNA World idea, there is no compelling model
of it.
>>
>> The model that the RNA (together with the DNA) is a sequence and that
the
>> genetic mechanism copies the information from a sequence (the
dna/rna)
>> into
>> a nonsequenced assembly (the living organism) and from there (by
means of
>> the ovaries and the testes) back into a sequence is a quite
compelling
>> model.
>>
>> The term "information" has been shown in this chatroom to
mean the cuts
>> that
>> segregate, separate and distinguish summands;
>> The term "sequence" has been defined by Peano;
>> The term "nonsequenced /=commutative/assembly" is indeed
hairy, as there
>> exists no definition for multidimensional partitions, although this
is
>> what
>> it means;
>> The term "copies" means a filter restriction on a set of
entries into a
>> database (a restricted, in optimal case, bijective map between two
>> enumerations).
>>
>> So, we can say:
>> Genetic information management can be modelled by assuming that
>> The information (the pattern of cuts on intervals)
>> In a sequence
>> Gets copied into
>> The information (the pattern of cuts on several intervals)
>> In a commutative assembly
>> And from there back.
>>
>> A mathematician would never go near or touch something that has no
>> definition. Contrary to a psychologist, who has a quite different
attitude
>> towards things undefined.
>> Even, if a logical entity behaves in a fashion that it is not
possible to
>> say by rational words what it is, we can count its differing
subtypes. In
>> the Middle Ages, they maybe counted different aspects of witchcraft
or
>> aurification. It is legitimate to count differing appearances of a
thing
>> even if we do not know what the thing is; as long as we can
distinguish
>> two
>> different kinds of that something. And that we can distinguish two
>> differing
>> multidimensional partitions (e.g. sociograms) is an obvious truth.
>> By counting distinguishable appearances of a logical entity we do not
know
>> the exact nature of, we can establish its logical width, domain,
>> complexity.
>> In the present case, we only need to know how many different kinds of
>> multidimensional partitions exist, not what they are in reality.
>>
>> In reality, and this answers the other question in the post:
>>> I know of no scientific principle that allows
>>> for ANY analogous entity in nature,
>>> save humans, to store its structural information
>>> digitally on a specific kind of molecular template.
>> What one means by the term "multidimensional partitions"
appears to be the
>> cut pattern on the set. We have spoken about the cuts separating two
>> similar
>> units generating the basis of our present counting system, N. They
are
>> thought as unit as we think the unit to be of unit properties, that
is,
>> alike to any other unit.
>> We overlook the existence of the diversity of the cuts. If we think
the
>> cuts
>> as extremely unit like as we think the units unit like, there remains
no
>> space for the diversity property of the opposite of the similarity.
>> We end up like a partial judge who listens only to the one side. Yes,
our
>> counting system is based on similarity. So what is it opposed to? Who
>> represents the interests of those who are defined irrelevant?
>> The cuts have differing heights and numbers. We should not force them
to
>> be
>> in the same - similarity based - logical picture as that they are the
>> enemies of. The cut is the mortal enemy of the continuation, and it
>> succeeds
>> in discontinuing our perception. (We do not go, after all, as
consequently
>> to the end in asserting similarity as to say that everything is one
and
>> without any interruption.)
>> We do accept the existence and the relevance of the cuts, but we
really do
>> not recognise their legal right to be there and to be counted in
their own
>> facon d'etre.
>> Once you start co-employing the cut patterns alongside the texture,
the
>> mechanism will become apparent, by which only such sequences can
exist,
>> where the cut pattern agrees to the cut pattern on the heap of
textile.
>> The
>> key element in the mechanism is the individuating power of the
symbols
>> employed, and that boils down again to diversity, that is how diverse
are
>> the logical units we use to describe the world with.
>> It is a long and detail-rich seminar one needs in order to re-educate
>> himself on using diversity alongside similarity. The FIS chatroom may
not
>> be
>> in its intention such, so we cannot go more in details here. But
please
>> let
>> me keep the chance to maintain the belief that the model - compelling
to
>> me
>> - that our logic has heretofore not been sufficiently complex to
describe
>> the most basic method of densifying information, namely that of
writing
>> and
>> rewriting it from a sequence into a commutative assembly and back, by
>> employing symbols that individuate in differing extents. We can
increase
>> the
>> complexity of our logic by co-employing the heretofore neglected
aspect of
>> the properties of the cuts and their patterns. This makes the
counting
>> system itself more exact as a self-referencing instrument by the
factor of
>> 0.3E-96; it allows size-independent logical and numerical statements;
it
>> generates numerically comparable levels and densities of logical
truth; it
>> connects the units of the counting levels "logical
relation" and "object";
>> it employs logical archetypes with properties that are enumerated in
a
>> numbering system, of which the basic units are the fillup limits of
the
>> electron layers.
>>
>> So, there are quite many and well-founded arguments for assuming that
>> indeed
>> there appears to exist a logical answer to the great question of
natural
>> science, how genetics functions, and that this is a model to which
>> reasonable and sober people can say this is a convincing, say
compelling
>> model.
>>
>> Thank you for the opportunity to advertise the
>> sequential-commutative-sequential mantra, which is identical to the
>> similar-diverse-similar mantra.
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>
>
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Received on Wed Nov 8 18:59:49 2006
