Replying to LOET, who said:
> Dear colleagues, I agree with most of what is said, but it does not
>apply to social systems because these -- and to a lesser extent also
>psychological ones -- operate differently from the hierarchical
>formations that are generated "naturally". That is why we oppose
"nature"
>to "culture" in the semantics: cultural (and social) systems
enable us to
>model the systems under study and this changes the hierarchical order. I
>understand that Maturana et al. argue that the next-order systems always
>model the lower-order ones, but then the word "model" is used
>metaphorically. The model (e.g., the biological) model enables us to
>reconstruct the system(s) under study to such an extent that we are able
>to intervene in these systems, e.g. by using a technology. This inverts
>the hierarchy. Thus, let me write in Stan's notation: biological
>{psychological {social}} -- or is this precisely the opposite order, Stan?
S: The hierarchy is not "inverted". {psychological {social}}
states
both that the social realm arises out of, and is a refinement of, the
psychological, AND that the social regulates/ interprets/ controls/
contextualizes the psychological. It is likely that there are opposing
opinions on this relationship, as some might have it be reversed. This
decision rides on the question of whether psychology existed prior to
sociality in the biological realm. And THAT depends upon definitions of
sociality. I myself weakly favor the way Loet put it -- {biological
{psychological {social}}}, but I could likely be persuaded to acccept
instead {biological {social {psychological}}}.
> -- then our scientific models enable us to change nature, for example,
>by building dykes like in Holland and thus we get: {social {biological}
>since the ecological changes can also be planned in advance.
S: This is in line with the standard view that the social realm is
higher than the biological, and regulates/ interprets/ controls/
contextualizes the biological, AND the lower levels down to the physical as
well. The relations, {physical constraints (material/chemical constraints
{biological constraints {sociocultural constraints}}}}, are transitive from
the higher levels. Loet's example is not significantly different from
beavers making a dam to create a pond. Note that this applies only to
those aspects of lower integrative levels that come under the purvue of a
particular social system.
>While lower-order systems are able to entertain a model of the next-lower
>ones -- and even have to entertain a model -- human language enables us
>not only to exchange these models, but also to study them and to further
>codify them.
S: I believe Loet is using "lower-order" here incorrectly
for the
specification hierarchy formalism, which is {lower order {higher order}}.
>The further codification sharpens the knife with which we can cut into
>the lower-level ones. We are not constrained to the next-order lower
>level, but we can freely move through the hierarchy and develop different
>specialties accordingly (chemistry, biology, etc.).
S: This again is true of the specification hierarchy, which, as a
subsumptive hierarchy, is, as I say above, transitive from the higher
levels down.
>Scientists are able to adjust the focus of the lense. This is a cultural
>achievement which was generated naturally, but once in place also had the
>possibility to distinguish between genesis and validity. No lower-level
>systems can raise and begin to answer this question.
S: I have no reason, based in the hierarchy, to disagree with this.
This is why we must erect a sociocultursal level in the hierarchy.
>And doubling reality into a semantic domain that can operate relatively
>independently of the underlying (represented) layer increases the
>complexity which can be absorbed with an order of magnitude. The issue
>is heavily related to the issue of modernity as a specific form of social
>organization. While tribes ("small groups") can still be
considered using
>the "natural" metaphor, and high cultures were still organized
>hierarchically (with the emperor or the pope at the top), modern social
>systems set science "free" to pursue this reconstruction in a
>techno-economic evolution. "All that is solid, will melt into
air"
>(Marx). Because of our biological body, we are part of nature, but our
>minds are entrained in a cultural dynamics at the supra-individual level
>("culture") which feeds back and at some places is able
increasingly to
>invert the hierarchy.
S: Again, true -- that is why we must erect a sociocultursal level in
the hierarchy!
Then STEVEN said:
>I must disagree with the notion that there is any real separation of
>nature and culture. There are things that can be known that do not exist -
>as a general category that includes culture - but culture does not stand
>alone - it's right up there with irrational numbers and televisions.
>The force of natural ethics (inevitable behaviors) is mediated by
>convention and manifest in the behavior of individuals - culture is merely
>one such convention.
S: This depends upon what is meant by "separation". In the
specification hierarchy the separation denoted by the { bracket allows a
kind of interpenetration. As I said above, it means both {A gives rise to
-> {B}} and {{B} contextualizes -> A}. But without marking these
boundaries we fail to note that there are different realms in Nature as we
have constructed it in our discourses.
Then PEDRO said:
> On the hierarchies debate, I would like to enter the role of
"boundary
>conditions" ... when we make "reverse engineering", trying
to go from
>scratch stuff to the prototype , (stuffs(parts(wholes))) a la Stan, the
>big problem where the crucial info resides is in the
>forms-designs-assemblies, so that boundary conditions for every functional
>set are properly established.
S: Boundary conditions are set in any hierarchy by the higher levels
for the lower ones. That is why we can say that biology constrains
chemistry wherever it occurs.
>The inner "constraints" also count, of course, but somehow are
given for
>free (usually are part of the "nature" of the stuff).
S: Yes, they function as material causes. Chemistry is a material
cause of biology, while biology imposes formal an final causes upon
chemistry.
>This fact of not being able to introduce the boundary conditions in the
>construct makes those hierarchical categorizations as empty, useless
>conceptualizations ---brittle, rhetorical ones like those pompous Expert
>Systems of Artificial Intelligence (we all remind that fanfare during
>early 80's).
S: But we are able to find the boundary conditions established by
higher levels in hierarchies. So, I can't see the problem. It may be that
hierarchical frameworks are not useful for all kinds of problems. I feely
admit it. The artificial intelligence folks, now oriented to seemingly
non-hierarchical 'agent based simulations' are becoming interested in
hierarchcal structures even now.
> Also, the tremendously changing nature of the boundary conditions around
>us, makes the severe dichotomies like nature-culture as artifacts. What a
>meal is? Depending on the context of the event, it is chemical,
>biophysical, mechanical, psychological, neurological, social,
>administrative, legal, cultural, fashionable... what aspect becomes more
>relevant depends on the generativity of the occasion.
S: True. And hierarchical analysis can be useful in some cases, as in:
{biophysical {chemical {mechanial {psychological {social}}}}} in the case
of a meal.
Then TED said:
>But we cannot of levels higher than us. So if there are higher levels of
>emergent structure beyond social systems - entirely possible and likely -
>we couldn't understand it. I believe this is why the notion of a God or
>gods is so persistent.
S: Well, if we use definite formats, like subsumptive or
compositionbal hierarchical models, we can project certain properties
beause we understand the relations between levels in these models.
>Note in this, that a higher level of organization with its own emergent
>laws is a quite different thing (the way I am talking here) than just
"more
>structure." So international peace, Gaia, or Stonier's internet-based
>"global brain" are all within our current, social layer.
S: I take it you are saying that we could not understand the
particulars of transations at the new level -- in the way that molecules
could not conceive of, say, 'gambling' or 'running'. Yes, that would be
the case. However, whatever these new relations might be, we could
understand that their results will impose boundary conditions upon our
existence, and that our activities will provide material causes for the
existence of that new level.
>So I cannot give you an example. But I think we can say some things about
>it if we can suss out the steps associated with complexity breaking at
>lower levels and extrapolate.
S: We have been trying to generally understand emergence for some
time now. There are numerous models, but the issue is still open.
Then KOICHIRO said:
> John Collier's distinction between "restrict and enable" in the
form
>of constraints reminds me once again of the remarks on boundary conditions
>made by Michael Polanyi back in the sixties.
S: I liked his usage that a higher level "harnesses" the
properties of
the lower levels to its interests (he was dealing with a speciication
hierarchy concept).
>This time, it came through Goedel's incompleteness theorem stating that
>both the decidability (either true or false, and not in between) and the
>consistency of the statements made in an arbitrary axiomatic system cannot
>coexist. There should be a statement or a theorem which could be right but
>not proved right within the given system. A negative aspect of the
>incompleteness theorem is restrictive as literally respecting the
>axiomatic manipulation or algorithm, while its positive aspect is found in
>enabling as admitting a possibility that such an algorithmic computation
>cannot stop. An explicitly positive form of the enabling aspect can be
>found in the occurrence of an inductive judgment.
S: In hierarchy theory terms, the problem is solved by moving to a
higher level 'meta' discourse, which will make an interpretation that will
be both complete and consistent from that higher level perspective.
STAN
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Received on Wed Feb 7 22:35:43 2007
