Reply to Pedro Re: Multiple Kinds of Information

Dear Pedro:

I certainly agree with you that the different kinds of cellular systems
that you enumerate are heterogeneous in nature. I also agree that my
dynamical model of the meaning of information does not encompass them
all. I am not clear whether this means that (1) the notion of
information simply cannot be unified under a single model---that is,
there is an irreducible pluralism of kinds of information; (2) we ought
to restrict the notion of information (at least in the intrinsic and
semantic sense) to only some of the these systems; or (3) my model is
completely on the wrong track and should be abandoned altogether.
(Obviously, these are not mutually exclusive possibilities!)

One point I would like to make in defense of my model is that it may be
applied at various hierarchical levels. Thus, the individual protein
may be envisaged as a low-energy-trigger dependent, nonlinear
oscillator, but so may higher-level systems such as metabolic pathways,
nucleoprotein complexes, organelles, cells, multicellular organs, whole
organisms, and societies. (The model is intended to apply to any
cognitive agent whatsoever.) Since "low-energy" is a relative concept,
the fact that allosteric regulation of proteins within higher-level
systems occurs via covalent bonding may or may not be able to be
accommodated by the model.

Whether this is an adequate answer to your challenge, I don't know. I
am certainly open to other ideas. Let me just mention the desiderata
that I was hoping that my model would satisfy, and that I think need to
be met somehow, if we are to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of
information.

(1) Intrinsicness --- We should account for the information relation (or
interaction) as it exists for a given organism itself, not as its exists
for the human observer who is theorizing the relation. Of course, such
an account can then be applied to the act of observation, as well, but
the intrinsic or objective case is fundamental.

(2) Normativity --- Any theory of information ought to take into account
the normative or semantic aspect of information. The value or meaning of
information for an organism is the heart of the matter.

(3) Action --- Information should be understood in a pragmatic sense, as
essentially involved in functional action.

(4) Emergence --- We must try to understand our own case as emerging
over time out of simpler cases, not theorize simpler and evolutionarily
earlier cases in terms of concepts that apply primarily to us. Thus,
implicit knowing (knowing how) is more fundamental than explicit knowing
(knowing that).

(5) Self-Organization --- There must be a way to understand how the
information relation can have come into being via a natural process
(i.e., with the origin of life). This seems to me to require a
"bottom-up" theory that begins at the level of macromolecules, because
if we refer the normativity to the cell as a whole in a "top-down"
fashion, how can we ever hope to explain how such a system came into
existence?

Even if my own theory fails to take all the forms of information you
mention into account, perhaps it might be useful to discuss whether a
successful theory of information must satisfy these criteria.

Best regards,

James
Received on Wed Jun 26 00:41:43 2002