Re: Platonic information theories

At 08:19 AM 05/01/2003, you wrote:

> > On the other hand, information is also closely related to logic,
> > and logic was separated from psychology and other empirical
> > studies by Frege and Husserl in Europe, and Peirce in America,
> > at great length, and I think convincingly. Peirce also related logic
> > to information.
> >
> > My own feeling is that the concept of information transcends
> > the distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian versions of
> > morphs, and that is one of its strengths.
> >
> > John
> >
>
>in this case we should be able to develop a *Theory of information
>relativity*, i.e. give up (if ever we had it...) a general representation
>of information as a kind of fluidum or 'quinta essentia' separated
>from the local systems and constraints. It seems to me that we have
>to deal with the *divide* that separates systems (as humans) being
>able to behave (in different ways) to time (and space) and systems
>*just* being in time/space (in different ways, as living/non living systems.
>The *bridge* between humans-in-time and other systems could be
>Weizsaecker's view of a 'logic of time' i.e. of irreversibility (at least
>from the relative viewpoint of a finite observer/actor). *Richer* forms
>of information depend on the ability of a system to *relate* to time/space.
>But this *relation* is a problematic one, since time and space are
>not of the kind of empirical objects (as Kant stated). So too our
>relation to information is a (in a Kantian sense) *problematic* one
>(i.e. there is no *solution* as in case of empirical *problems*). To
>conceive ourselves (and our Selves) as an *information machine*
>is a *phantasmatic* idea...
>Rafael

I don't see that we have to give up a version of information
theory that can serve as a sort of fixed point. One of the advantages
of the relativization of space and time was the recognition that they
are not fundamental, but that the interval was. Likewise with matter
and energy, replaced with a broader view of energy. In this case
the richer forms of information that you mention are merely shown
not to be fundamental. I think the problem you refer to Kant is a phoney
one that results from placing out ideas above empirical evidence.
Kant was wrong; space and time are empirical entities. Our
intuitions of them can be wrong and corrigible. Likewise with
information, or for that matter for irreversibility. I think that the
very Kantian problems arise from a false obsession with our
human perspective, and that they are bogus problems resulting from
taking some of our limitations and projecting them as transcendent.
This is an impediment to seeing things clearly, and has much in
common with parochial religion.

John
Received on Sun Jan 5 15:22:19 2003