Re: [Fis] A definition of Information

Dear all (especially John and Stan)

My interpretation of Peirce ontological theory of mind is also based on
this important quote that Jesper points to below. But let me add a few
others from an article I just finished for Axiomathes.

"Far less has any notion of mind been established and generally
acknowledged which can compare for an instant in distinctness to the
dynamical conception of matter. Almost all the psychologists still tell
us that mind is consciousness. But …unconscious mind exists. What is
meant by consciousness is really in itself nothing but feeling. …there
may be, and probably is, something of the general nature of feeling
almost everywhere, yet feeling in any ascertainable degree is a mere
property of protoplasm, perhaps only of nerve matter. Now it so happens
that biological organisms, and especially a nervous system are favorably
conditioned for exhibiting the phenomena of mind also; and therefore it
is not surprising that mind and feeling should be confounded. …that
feeling is nothing but the inward aspect of things, while mind on the
contrary is essentially an external phenomenon."(Peirce, CP: 7.364.)

Thus, the essence of consciousness is feeling and an important aspect of
Firstness is pure feeling. From a Peircian framework with its synechism,
you have to admit that the universe is permeated with Firstness, but
that is not the same thing as human awareness (though it is the origin
of it). Peirce writes.
"What the psychologists study is mind, not consciousness exclusively. …
consciousness is a very simple thing. …not…Self-consciousness …
consciousness is nothing but Feeling, in general, -- not feeling in the
German sense, but more generally, the immediate element of experience
generalized to its utmost. Mind, on the contrary is a very difficult
thing to analyze. I am not speaking of Soul, the metaphysical substratum
of Mind (if it has any), but of Mind phenomenally understood. To get
such a conception of Mind, or mental phenomena, as the science of
Dynamics affords of Matter, or material events, is a business which can
only be accomplished by resolute scientific investigation."(Peirce, CP:
7.365)

Peirce is not speaking of human self-consciousness but of the essence of
consciousness as a phenomenon that develops in nature to emerge in new
and more structured forms in living beings, nervous systems and
language-based culture. Peirce writes about this concept of thought,
understood as a function of mind and semiosis:

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and
one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the
shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Not only is thought in the
organic world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General
without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without
Signs. We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too
wide a sense to come within our definition."(Peirce, CP: 4.551)

Here Peirce is widening the semiosis concept to include chemical
pattern-creating processes as nature's thinking. I would prefer to call
these proto- semiotic processes to avoid a too broad sense of the
concept leading into a pan-semiotic metaphysics. But, nevertheless,
Perice's metaphysics operates with the "inside" of material nature. He
writes:

"Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there in the same proportion
feeling exists. In fact, chance is but the outward aspect of that which
within itself is feeling."(Peirce, CP: 6.265)

Chance, spontaneity and feeling are connected to Firstness that forms
the basic and vague link between everything. However, from a biosemiotic
view, it does not develop into genuine signs before organized into
living cells. To see the habits or laws of nature as signs in themselves
for the Universe, you have to construct the Universe as a subject. That
would be a subject so abstract that it would be far beyond ordinary
human comprehension.

The basic philosophical problem is whether in a Peirciean framework you
can have Thirdness without sign quality. If you want to make the
universe in itself an interpreter the answer is no. But, from a
biological perspective, what we call signs and semiosis are working
within quite different space and time frames. It is true that Peirce
wrote that "the universe is perfused with signs" and that he looks at
matter "as effete mind" and finally, his Synchistic doctrine connects
mind with matter and sees mind as continuity and semiosis. He further
sees "the one original law to be the recognized law of mind, the law of
association, of which the laws of matter are regarded as mere special
results" (Peirce, CP: 6.277). Peirce writes the following that can be
seen as essential to his contribution to a theory of mind:

"Hence, it would be a mistake to conceive of the psychical and the
physical aspects of matter as two aspects absolutely distinct. Viewing a
thing from the outside, considering its relation of action and reaction
with other things, it appears as matter. Viewing it from the inside,
looking at its immediate character as feeling, it appears as
consciousness. …remember that mechanical laws are nothing but acquired
habits, like all the regularities of mind, including the tendency to
take habits, itself; …this action of habit is nothing but
generalization, and generalization is nothing but spreading of
feelings." (Peirce, CP: 6.268)

If we cannot have Secondness and Thirdness in nature without
interpretants being established, then every stable entity in the
universe has to be considered a sign, and there are no objects to refer
to. Even if dyadic relationships are almost always embedded in the
triadic mediating force of Thirdness and final causation, they must be
considered to have independent existences. To make sense, in Peirce's
metaphysics, and to be compatible with the work done in the sciences, we
must primarily view the laws of nature as objects in themselves.
I do not want to conceptualize the idea of natural laws in any
transcendental way. Apart from the law of mind, Peirce sees them as
immanent. In modern scientific language one would say that they emerge
out of the symmetry breaking that is generated by the cooling of the
universe.But under the law of mind and habittaking.

This is the view I am challenging Stan on. Do we share this and if so
what are the consequenses for his thermodynamic view and criteria for
establising interpretants?

Sorry for the length! Soren

Jesper Hoffmeyer wrote:
>
> Hi, Stan, Søren and John
>
> Just dumping in on the latest exchanges: As you
> know I am neither a Peirce scholar or a
> philosopher, but it seems to me that the
> following quote from the 1891 paper in the Monist
> "The Architecture of Theories" points to an
> ontological interpretation of the law of habit
> taking as I prefer to call it (because people
> invariably identifies mind with human mind, which
> was definitely not what Peirce had in mind):
>
> "In the beginning - infinitely remote - there was
> a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being
> without connection or regularity would properly
> be without existence. This feeling, sporting here
> and there in pure arbitrariness, would have
> started the germ of a generalising tendency. Its
> other sportings would be evanescent, but this
> would have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency
> to habit would be started; and from this, with
> the other principles of evolution, all the
> regularities of the universe would be evolved."
> (Peirce 1931-35) CP 6.33).
>
> Jesper
>
> >At 11:26 AM 2004/03/16, Søren Brier wrote:
> >>Dear Stan
> >>
> >>The problem I am raising is that according to Peirce pure feeling as
> >>Firstness is there from the beginning and as such internally in matter
> >>and energy - and so is the law of mind. But you seem to build up the
> >>hierarchy in a fairly physicalistic way.
> >
> >With all due respect, Søren, this is a controversial issue in Peirce
> >scholarship. The consensus on Peirce-L is that Firstness is a mode
> >of being, but that it cannot exist on its own, since existence arises
> >only with Secondness. After that, various people tend to disagree
> >about the roles of the two. Peirce's few remarks on Hegel, with whom
> >he agrees in some respects, and distances himself in others, probably
> >need to be investigated closely to get any further than two alternative
> >views that Firstness is both ontologically and logically prior to Secondness,
> >or that it is not ontologically prior. Peirce's texts seem to support both
> >interpretations, according to the discussions on Peirce-L. As I understand
> >Stan, he would accept the logical primacy of Firstness, as being required
> >by Secondness, but not its ontological primacy as being able to exist
> >without Secondness. The "law of mind", it seems to me to apply to logical
> >primacy (the possibilities) and not ontological
> >primacy (existence). So I think
> >that Stan's interpretation is consistent with what we currently know about the
> >interpretation of Peirce. It seems to me that
> >the coming of mind into existence
> >could occur much later than the primal being of its possibilities (laws, if
> >you want).
> >
> >John
> >
> >
> >John
> >
> >I've found the link between apes and civilised men - it's us.
> > -- Konrad Lorenz
> >John Collier collierj@ukzn.ac.za
> >Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
> >T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031
> >http://www.kli.ac.at/research.html?personal/collier
> >http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/index.html
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> --
> -
> Jesper Hoffmeyer
> University of Copenhagen
> Department of Biological Chemistry
> Sølvgade 83
> DK 1307 Copenhagen K
> Denmark
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> Fax +45 3532 2040
>
> hoffmeyer@mermaid.molbio.ku.dk
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>
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-- 
Venlig hilsen/Best wishes Søren Brier
Handelshøjskolen København/Copenhagen Business School
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