Commenting on Steven's posting:
He said:
> The shift between the complex and the non-complex systems of information
>comes from our underlying theories of nature that allow us to interpret
>difference. Gravity is my favorite example here where we see a clear
>progression of interpretation from Galileo through Newton to Einstein -
>all founded essentially on the same observable differences.
>
> Falsification plays a central role in moving us from one interpretation
>to another - and it is because Newton's theories are falsifiable that we
>can readily accept Einstein. Einstein's theories explain more of the
>observable differences - IOW "they have greater consistency with the
>available information."
SS: One should note that all scientific theories must be falsifiable.
If a theory is not, is not really a scientifc theory.
> The theory of Evolution is informed by observable differences at a level
>of greater complexity - and it can be seen that science makes the same
>mistakes as it did between Newton and Einstein. It is the underlying
>premise that alters the interpretation of apprehended information.
SS: You speak as if Newton's theory was falsified. This is not so --
in the realm in which it is appropriate. Einstein's view is just more
general. In a classical situation we get just as much 'information' from
either perspective!
Steven continues:
> The formal metaphysical question then becomes how we analyze and
express our apprehension and interpretation - and this is no longer a
question of the definition of information but now one of analysis,
communication and convention, by which we build consensus in formal
deliberation.
>
> It is in this context that my proposed quantification of and role for a
>primitive of experience apply - we simply cannot correctly interpret the
>available information without it. This premise and the formal operator
>"experience-of" essentially add the basis of complexity to
current
>convention and moves us toward a place for experience in our formal
models.
SS: In scientific models there is usually place for a variable that
would represent an observable, and it is here that experience inputs into
such models. What else do you mean?
> I meant rather that it is necessary to include my proposed primitive in
>our understanding of how complex physical structure arises in nature. It
>is an addition to our models that enables a new interpretation of
>observable difference - just as, by analogy, the notion of the curvature
>of space time is an addition to the models of gravitation.
SS: So here Steven seems to refer to the idea that observation itself
will change the system being observed, which is often (?commonly) the case.
In other words he seems to be asking for a format to include observation as
a generative force. This is somewhat available in Peircean semiotics,
where a triadic understanding (object - sign - interpetant, with
interpretant connecting again to object, giving a triangle) is required.
Here a system of interpretance co-constructs the sign (along with
indications from the object), and, as well, constructs the interpretant.
So, here the sign is not so much 'discovered' empirically, as constructed
with help from observation.
This view connects to Laszlo's:
>I suppose the kind of question "What is information?" requires
first of
>all an ontological consideration, moreover a "definition" of its
"quality".
>
>In this respect I would propose a "hermeneutic" ontology, in
which we
>have an at least "two levels" world consists of the sign and its
context.
>
>In this world the information is an interpreted sign.
-snip-
>The crucial point is the interpretation. Interpretations partly preserve
>the sign in itself, as an individual being, but partly, at the same time
>consider it as the "sign of something else". Information is the
product
>of this "double seeing" practice.
-snip-
>I suppose that this definition harmonizes with many others. The meaning
>(and measurement) of quantity of information depends on the
>characterization of signs, context and interpretation.
STAN
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Received on Sun Sep 18 21:59:42 2005
