Dear FISers,
Unfortunately I could barely follow all the recent exchanges---for work
reasons-- and they were highly interesting, indeed. Without being able to
enter into specifics, what I glimpse from the last exchange between
Loet and John, particlularly from John's quest on conditions for
"transcendence" from physics, is that his conception of causality is
unidirectional, and that every conceivable happenstance has to be
compatible with the basic laws of physics. What happens, for instance, with
the software of computers? The explanatory province of physics ends with
the solid state of transistors. There after the system has the freedom of a
Turing machine --and computer science takes the lead. Demanding its
"reducibility" would be in my view a misplaced demand --and even worse,
irrelevant on almost every practical concern. The leap from cells to
thought seems almost infinitely complex, and in this very complexity there
is an effective barrier to any individual to substantiate at the time being
whether thought (& meaning) is reducible or not --no scientific theory of
consciousness yet.
About Loet's and other parties on meaning, I find it fascinating that the
human and biological problem of meaning can be cavalierly handled without
any regard to its materiality (paradoxically, now I am closer to John's).
Again, the leap from molecules to the living cell seems almost infinitely
complex --but perhaps not so much in our times of genomics, proteomics,
cellular signaling system, degradomics, etc. So, in this particular "leap"
one can watch into the mirror of molecular "reality" whether a living cell
instantiates or not --in its evanescent molecular complexion-- the proposed
scheme of meaning. But I have to concede defeat in this point, as almost no
party in this list has been interested in discussing about a
cellular-molecular approach to meaning. patience.
Perhaps I would be closer to John's terms on reducibility if a
two-way-street in the conditions and relations between disciplines is
accepted. In a form of civilized constructivism, not reached yet, the
social sciences, neurosciences, etc., should have perhaps under a more
proper (informational?) dressing some symmetric capabilities to dictate
conceptual conditions to physics and other fields. In a really mature
scientific enterprise, I bet one would not see a scale of disciplines, but
an "ecosystem" of knowledge. The recent neuromathematics,
neurophilosophy and neuroeconomics attempts are but an interesting preludium.
Anyhow, the avalanche was quite meaningful.
best regards
Pedro
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Received on Wed Feb 1 13:48:43 2006
