(1) Replying to Bob's below: Yes, I was specifically referring to human
mentality in my comments. I do agree with Bateson, and, using again the
specification hierarchy, I would see {cybernetic mentality {social
mentality {human linguistic metality}}}.
>On Tue, 7 Feb 2006, Stanley N. Salthe wrote:
>
>> But I think it possible to suggest that there could not be minds, as
we
>> spontaneously think of that term, without sociality (even in
animals). If
>> that is the case, then:
>
>Stan, This was not Gregory Bateson's take when he wrote "An Ecology
of
>Mind". Bateson saw "mind" present anywhere one had
cybernetic memory. He
>viewed human mentation as a limiting form of the more generally ubiquitous
>"mind".
>
>Then again, his is not what we "spontaneously" think of in
response to the
>word "mind". :)
(2) Replying to Igor's below: As a semiotician, I devise a theoretical
picture of the construction of meaning as a diagram. This diagram is
generalized from our understanding of the operation among our own human
minds of processes of induction, deduction, abduction, implication,
imputation, and so on. (I can send a copy of this diagram to anyone
desiring to see it.) Once we have such a diagram we see that its
categories are general enough to possibly be applied to other than human
mental process. Any system that has enough degrees of freedom related in
approximately the same way as the abstractions in the diagram can now be
imputed to be a semiotic system. In this way we can construct a
pansemiotics.
> Dear colleagues, Something is certainly lost in translation. Is
>there a meaning outside the mind? Is it not that WE create a meaning in
>the process of discourse? If yes, then in the chemical (or any other)
>hierarchies there are no meanings, but a possibility of a meaning, should
>an appropriate mind come nearby. If not, then we need to define
>meaning before we start discussing such involved questions. Maybe my
>education is not enough to perceive the subtleties, but I think that I am
>unable to understand, whether meaning is preserved or not before I
>receive a clear definition of meaning. Otherwise it is too vague, and
>we may as well do a very simple trick. Just find something that is
>preserved in chemical hierarchies, and then call it meaning :))))))
(3) Jamie said:
>Meaning arises in situations of purposeful APPLICATION.
>And -that- does not require ... 'mind'.
It is such situations that are modeled in the above mentioned diagram
of semiosis.
>If you want to restrict the definiiton of 'meaning'
>to human pertinence only, then of course 'mind' would
>be a present component and a likely 'requisite', but,
>in generalist standing, 'mind' is not required for
>'meaning'.
Right -- {meaning as a set of semiotic relations {human
understanding}}.
(4) Pedro said:
>The evolutionary approach to "meaning" could get interesting
yields too,
>properly starting with the cellular underpinnings, within molecular
>bionetworks themselves. Let me try a brief preamble. Ab initio, perhaps it
>is necessary distinguishing between perturbation, signaling and
>communication. The open system of the cell may be perturbed by quite many
>instances---but not meaningfully. We may talk about meaning only when the
>perturbing event is a "signal" , so to speak "abduced"
from the
>environment (recognized as such by devoted receptors) following genomic
>wisdom guideliness, and implying a closure of events regarding survival
and
>reproduction within the niche. Thereafter "communication"
belongs to the
>exchange of signals and responses between living partners involving well
>established sequences and protocols (for instance, already in bacteria:
>symbiotic events, colonies, differentiation, collective motion, predation,
>etc.) also with overall adaptive closure.
This is a good view of biosemiotics. I think there is a possible problem
here involving "well established sequences and protocols" in that there
could be a danger that these are (or can become) merely arbitrary -- the
products of evolution discourse. The reason is that the environment, in
any of its innumerable facets, could change significantly enough so that
some of the protocols no longer can relate to it effectively. There is the
principle in neoDarwinism a view emphasizing a 'continual deterioration of
the environment' -- 'deterioration' being any change whatever from the
expectations of living systems. This must be 'continual' because there are
so many facets of an environment. It is supposed that various kinds of
mutations of successful living systems happen at a rate commensurate with
the average rate of change of environment. One line of thinking within
neoDarwinism emphasizes this relationship, so that a population is viewed
as simply trying to keep up with environmental change -- just trying to'
stay in the game'. This line of thinking conflicts with another
neoDarwinian tradition that emphasizes the process of adaptation -- that
is, the process of evolving these "established sequences and protocols".
These two lines of thought have not been resolved into one theory.
STAN
_______________________________________________
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
Received on Sat Feb 11 22:04:27 2006
