Dear Andrei,
Once again thank you for your moderation of our discussion
and for your patience. I would not like to try your patience
more, but I have some questions.
It looks like the discussion has become focused on the
controversy between the realistic and operational
interpretations of quantum mechanics QM. However, the issues
of interpretation of various scientific theories are much
older. We can ask similar questions whether classical
mechanics (CM) describes some transcendent reality, or it is
our mind's tool to comprehend this reality (Kant). Or, the
question about the status of geometry.
We can ask about the status of relativity (not only of
Einstein's relativity, but Galilean too). Each time we can
be puzzled by the inconsistencies with our intuition.
I could find in the present discussion quite frequent
statements about individual beliefs ("I accept ...
interpretation" or "I am going beyond Copenhagen
interpretation...") or about group preferences ("Copenhagen
interpretation is a common view of physicists..." or "At
this or that conference there was a common agreement..."
The discussion of beliefs is a questionable business. For me
most important is what are the arguments for or against
given preferences, not who, or how many people believe in
something. I know that those whose philosophical ground is
in some form of pragmatism (e.g. early American pragmatism)
would consider consensus of beliefs of "scientific
community" as a criterion of truth, but it is as good
philosophical view as any other, and many people do not
subscribe to it.
I think we should separate several aspects of the QM
interpretation:
a) What do we want to interpret (exactly what formalism?),
b) What are our philosophical positions?
c) What is common in different approaches?
d) What is different in different approaches?
Remembering about these questions and the possible answers,
we can try to clarify the situation.
What definitely counts as "common" is that the current
formalisms of QM are different from the formalisms of CM.
This brings the following question.
Are the differences between formalisms:
- reflections of the differences in the domains of the
application (different physical realities, or different
components of the reality requiring different intellectual
tools),
- differences in the tools, but the reality itself is
uniform (hidden variables for classical form of uniformity,
classical mechanics as approximation of the one purely
quantum reality), or
- there is no reality at all (or we cannot know it at all),
and the differences are in ourselves, in the ways how we
create our subjective views of the apparent reality.
I do not see how these differences influence our objective
to discuss quantum information? Am I missing something?
I understand (especially after your reports) that the new
developments question the role of experimental results
attemting to settle the issue of impossibility of hidden
variables through Bell's inequalities.
Well, too bad. But is it so dramatic situation? It does not
mean that somebody has proved something. We just know less
than we thought we knew. It does not compell anybody to
switch from one of the positions above to another.
But, how all that is influencing our subject of quantum
information? Could you please present your view?
You wrote (if I understand you correctly) that you cannot
accept the subjective interoretation of QM or of probability
(or both), because you need independent reality to consider
information. I do not say that I oppose it, but I do not see
how the argument works. Somebody could make just an opposite
statement, QM or probability should be interpreted in
subjective terms, as they are related to information, and
information is a subjective concept. (It is not my view, so
please do not ask me to defend it. But, it is a possible
argument.)
And finally, one general question. Where are we in the
discussion of QI? What questions did we answer? What new
questions did we formulate? What questions do we want to
answer?
Regards,
Marcin
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Received on Fri Jun 9 10:12:34 2006
