[Fis] Objective and Perceptual Realities and probabilities[Fis] Objective and Perceptual Realities and probabilities
From: Arne Kjellman <kjellman@dsv.su.se>
Date: Sun 11 Jun 2006 - 21:16:11 CEST
Dear members of List:
To Marcin I would say:
The central question par excellence to any scientist/modeller - is as to whether human knowing can
justify its circumstantial and confusing dualistic elaboration of two separate domains (reality and
the presumed knowledge of it) or if we can do better (and hopefully possibly remove the present
inconsistencies) by applying the monistic Copenhagen interpretation (CI)to all forms of human
knowing. The SOA lays a claim to the latter - but even if SOA is a new paradigm from several points
of view the very approach not new. Its its seed can be traced at least back to Protagoras who
claimed: "a man [the collected private knowledge of his] is the [ONLY] measure of all
things", which seems to be an early variant of Niels Bohr (or maybe we today read to much into
Protagoras saying.)
To Andrei I want to say:
I admire your ability to so strongly engagage in these discussion. Unforntunately I think my sweeping
explications made you to totally miss the point with restricting human knowledge to an abstract
unary domain of experience as defined by SOA .. Anyhow I find your way of reasoning about
"reality" somewhat confusing. In case the contributions of reality and theory are
inseparable to a human knower (as you and CI agree with) how can you then possibly make reference to
a reality that is unknowable - and furthermore claim models are approximations to this conceived
reality? If you claim acceptance of the CI with its forbidden ontological commitments how can you
claim the knowledge of a "substantial reality" separated from observation - whether so by
means of "information" or anything whatsoever?
To my mind science can possibly come to an agreement that behind this experienced stability is a
phenomenon we can call "reality" (but this is a risky endeavour - I prefer to call it a
hypothetical "out-there-ness") but it is never possible to give features or properties to
such a "reality" or its eventual furniture. This situation makes all talk about
comparisons in the guise of truth, truthlikeness, approximation or even representation totally in
vain and in utterly misleading - because there is simply no knowable template for an observer to
involve in such comparisons. Then also Chris's idea that the "wave function is 'information
representation' of our believes about physical systems." He should at least wash away the term
physical for the reason such a statement clearly is undecidable when reality and theory are
inseparable in principle. This inseparability in fact make the physical/mental distinction
scientifically invalid and the use of terms like "physical information" just create
confusion.
After all science is about to digging out beliefs that are strongly confirmable in one way or
other - and then one is forbidden to use terms or models that are undecidable. So I would not agree
with Marcin when saying "discussion of beliefs is a questionable business." This is part
of the consequences of the necessary use of models and tests performed on them - the most useful and
confirmable ones are the most credible. This is a matter of confirmable belief - since there is no
truth template to find in this situation.
To SOA the wave function models the most probable outcome given today's ageed upon experience
(scientific) - but SOA refrains from making commitment about the "essence" of the
feel-part of experience. A situation free lacking of commitment does not even allow acts of
classification. We must conclude that "experience is as it is" - and nothing more can be
said. Probably we in a similar way can define "information" as the "quantatitive part
of a chosen description of experience" and bury our inability to describe human experience in
its other part - the feel (or quale). So I find no reason - in fact bewildering - to try to classify
information using an outside/inside distinction, which is also forbidden. We know that our personal
experience is the basis for predictions but we simply cannot find out as to whether this experience
derives from out-there-ness or theory and must therefore, as Wittgenstein suggested, be silent in
this matter. In this view feels (qualia) cannot be conceptually communicated.
My point is that the real/unreal distinction is undecidable until the day we can dig out a definition
that is decidable and useful. However this do not seem possible because of the inseparability as
mentioned above. The use of undecidable terms is the poison of science - because they just result in
quarrels and endless discussions - and such terms can never be used in coherent decision making (may
they be subjective or consensual.) A.J. Ayer had a lot to say about that.
I also find reasons to think there is an "out-there-ness" because this is the only way I
can "make sense" of why QM predictions are so reliable/stable (useful) - but I am also
convinced that there is no way to feature this out-there-ness. So reality then is simply a NAME for
a phenomenon that we are unable to feature. So in this way we can say it exists - as a transcendent
phenomenon we can name however lacking of features. Since we, in this view, have no templates of
comparison and are forced to abort the idea of science as a "quest for truth" or certainty
- even an approximate one. Science aims at developing tools of prediction - MODELS - and device
rules how to use them.
On this point we are agreed, we create MODELS, but to my mind they can never be judged by comparison
- just by USEFULNESS IN PREDICTION; precisely as Bohr claims. As a matter of fact our private
perceptual impressions (or allusions as I prefer to say) are just other models created by our
biological perceptual apparatus and personal theories in cooperation to aid us as an INSTRUMENT in
action - like the systems used when landing an airplane in fog. Needless to say these instruments
are as private as the human being - and each decision therefore primarily subjective.
"Information is information about reality" sounds to me like a dogmatic statement. Such a
statement doesn't give me another clue but that you think we can "squese some sort of messages
out of reality" that is independent of a knowing mind. And this is what the Einstein/Bohr
controversy was about - Bohr rejecting the idea of knowing the features of reality and Einstein,
like Newton, claiming it to be God's unary creation. It might be - but we can never know, since such
a reality cannot possibly be singled out by our thinking - and then its "messages" can
neither. I would rather say that "information" presents to us a set of data (mainly
numbers) that we can use to fill IN a FORM (matrix or formula) that is specified by way of
scientific social consensus (and therefore also personally accepted hopefully.) However this
"information" has almost nothing to say about some God-given reality or the like. On the
other hand such information has more to say about my PRESENT FEELINGS i.e., my personal PRIVERSE,
because a mathematical expression is precisely a coded feel according to this view. (In this case I
also define a sensation as a complex of feels). This situation was not clearly recognised neither by
Quine, Carnap or Wittgenstein - however the early Russel come pretty close.
So the philosophy behind QM, which is a subjectivist's approach, and this approach had been in
constant struggle during the history of science with the pervailing objectivist's approach, which in
principle take the possibility to extract ontological knowledge for given - i.e., that reality is
given to mankind by God or Evolution - but not only reality - also given the gift to interpret this
creation (that sounds weird to those who are not clergymen). That the gift to find out what MODELS
are true or not. Bohr does not subscribe to this - and neither do the SOA.
To Gordana I will say that a useful priverse of course by education and co-existence is tuned to
agree with scientific consensus as well to the cultural norms of our time. However we must remember
that personal experience is the only direct-accessable experience there is and this makes human
knowing strictly personal. The fact that we gather, wash, compile and exchange personal experience
on a consensual basis (not objective!) in science does not affect the strict validity of the
principle named the "privacy of subjectivity."
Then each living being has his/hers own PRIVERSE (fund of experience) where the part of feel can only
be shared by ostentation. This view fits also very well with the idea advanced by Everett - that has
later become known under the name of "multiverses" (S. Weinberg) - but of course Everett
did not gave his idea the suggested SOA-interpretation.
To my mind the ontological issues are central and characteristic both of QM and science - and I think
we can make no further progress until this important question is settled - and needless to say this
include also the theories behind the catch word "quantium information" - which to my mind
very much motivate such discussions.
Best wishes
Dept. of Computer and Systems Sciences
_______________________________________________
|
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 on Sun 11 Jun 2006 - 21:19:16 CEST