Dear colleagues,
As usual, I am bolting sporadically into the discussion with my humble
comments. It looks like we are a bit imprisoned in the terminology here.
Please allow me to exercise my formal "Marxist" education.
The world out there does not know the word "matter". Matter is a primary
philosophical concept, our axiome that we introduce to deal (to model) the
real world. The concepts of "field", "particle" are derivatives of this
axiom, and space and time are also axioms. Therefore if we go down to the
basics, (deviating from the applied science which deals with matter
casually), we should always keep in mind that we may change the axioms if
necessary. The world will not change, only its description.
One of the ways to do so is to introduce information as a primary category,
which therefore needs no explanation or proof. The information incorporates
both material and ideal (never exists without the material carrier on one
hand, but is not limited to the carrier's physical properties). Then fields,
particles and such like become the derivatives of the information concept.
If we think a bit, any interaction is in fact exchange of information.
Yours, Igor
----- Original Message -----
From: "Arne Kjellman" <kjellman@dsv.su.se>
To: "fis" <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2006 1:57 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] : Reality of Information World?!!!
> Dear John and Andrei
>
> As usual you hit the head of the nail - but I think there is something
> missing:
>
> Andrei said:
>>> Fields are not less real than particles.
>
> John said:
>>> I am really advocating an information world, in which reality can
be
>>> understood as (am inclined
>>> to say are) information structures. On this account, our internal
>>> information space and the rest of the world are of the same basic
kind,
>
> You are dicussing the possibility to classify fields and information as
> REAL - and "existing" on an equal level as of REALITY - as
opposed to
> something else...experience I guess.
> Does this means you both both think it is consistently possible to
> classifying phenomena of science into the dichomoty REAL/UNREAL (or
> eventually MATERIAL/UNMATERIAL)?
> I mean do you think is it possible to come to such a distinction of
> phenomena on grounds of an obsevation science??
> In in this case on what criteria could such a distinction possibly be
> uphold?
> Do you expect a possible experimental "proof"? Like the way
physicists
> strive for an experiemental "proof" of Bell's inequality for
instance?
> Or can such a "proof" only be established by a social
convention -
> consensus? In this case a matter of consesual belief. And how do we then
> proceed from this very point?
>
> The SOA's line of arguing is that real/unreal distinction can only be
> grounded on social convention - i.e., a definition that is generally
> accepted but cannot be (ap)proved in a science based on experimental
> evidence. (The realist's dilemma is an attempt to show that human's
> capacity of perception is the cause that make this outcome a necessity.)
> However a decision in consensus can only be achieved in the case each
> individual participating in this act of consesual decision has made up
his
> mind, ie made a private decision in the matter under consideration. This
> is why science has to take off form the individual subject's point of
> view - the subject-oriented approach (SOA) - and accordingly make a
strict
> use of the first person's view.
>
> I sincerely wait for an answer in these crucial questions
> Arne
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Andrei Khrennikov" <Andrei.Khrennikov@vxu.se>
> To: <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2006 10:53 PM
> Subject: [Fis] Question to John Collier : Reality of Information
World?!!!
>
>
>>> > Dear John!
>> I do not send this Email directly to the list, because I am not an
>> sure... But it would be interesting your opinion. Why we cannot
>> conside information world as realistic as material? Why is only
matter
>> material? In physics we consider not only particles, but also
>> fields. Fields are not less real than particles. Moreover, since
>> Quantum Field Theory is considered as more fundamnetal than QM,
fields
>> and not particles are fundamental objects. Fields are not local, they
>> are distributed in space and time. But there is no reason to think
>> that the whole reality is related just to one special model of space-
>> time, that we call physical space time. WE can consider information
>> spaces (which could have a very different mathematical structure) and
>> information fields. They are not less real than physical fields.
>> It would be natural to suppose that there are information laws of
>> nature which are not less real than physical laws. Our role is
>> minimal - interaction with information fields and the latter are
real.
>>> > With Best REgards, Andrei Khrennikov
>>
>> Reply of John:
>>> > That is basically the position that I advocate. I go a step
>> further, however, and argue that physical causation (dynamics) can be
>> understood in information terms. Since I also believe that only what
>> is dynamical can be of any consequence, then I am really advocating
an
>> information world, in which reality can be understood as (am inclined
>> to say are) information structures. On this account, our internal
>> information space and the rest of the world are of the same basic
>> kind, and are continuous with each other. There is more to the story,
>> complications like meaning,
>> emergence, function, and so on, but I have been working on these.
>> There is a paper on my web site,
>> http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/causinf.pdf
>> Causation is the Transfer of Information (1999)
>> that lays out the basic ideas. More is in
>> http://www.newcastle.edu.au/centre/casrg/publications/Cods.pdf
>> Complexly Organised Dynamical Systems with C.A. Hooker (1999)
>> and other papers. The approach is very radical, so it needs a lot of
>> justification.
>>> > We are currently working on two books on the topic.
>>> > John
>>> Dear John,
>>>Can I now send our discussion to the list? It seems that my view
is
>> not so crazy. I also published a few papers and book on this:
>> Khrennikov A.Yu., Information dynamics in cognitive,
>>>psychological, social, and anomalous phenomena. Kluwer,
Dordreht,2004
>> Khrennikov A.Yu., Classical and quantum mechanics on information
spaces
>> with applications to cognitive, psychological,
>> social and anomalous phenomena. Found. of Physics, 29, N. 7, 1065-
>> 1098, 1999.
>>
>>>All the best, Andrei
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> fis mailing list
>> fis@listas.unizar.es
>> http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>
>>
>
>
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Received on Mon Jul 17 10:50:32 2006
