Re: Fwd: Some questions about the nature of informational theories

Dear Colleagues:

This email responds to several recent posts (Christophe, Rafael,
Soren and Pedro.)
My last post is appended below for reference.

Theory of Information:

Given the stated objectives, what constitutes a set of objective
criteria that would specify a theory of information? What would be
the role of abstraction in such a specifying of an informational
species?

I suspect that it is possible to specify a theory of communication
between two systems - such a specification of communication would a
priori place information in the same role that Shannon places
information - that is, as a transmitting agent. Theories of
molecular biological communication are well accepted in physiology
and medicine, eg, the second messenger hypothesis. The biological
specification of communication includes the specification of the
communicating species.

Christophe writes on Jan. 17,

"To cover the diversity, we could think about a general approach
on pragmatic aspect of information. It would be about
considering the evolution of the universe with corresponding
increases in complexity, and begin the analysis of "what is (that)
information for" at the lowest level possible. And then try to
analyse the possible evolution of the "rational for information",
with addition of new contributors as needed. "

In the main, I concur with Christophe's suggestion as a prudent
approach to theory building. Such an approach could be grounded in
the philosophy Bergson, De Chardin, and a wide range of various
system's theorists. ( This approach strongly influences my own
approaches to this topic.)

One difficulty in this approach is translating among the different
technical languages of the various disciplines. In order to
construct a theory applicable to multiple disciplines, one must a
priori find words and symbols that move freely among disciplines.
Philosophically, this task is analogous to moving freely between
external 'realities" and internal belief structures and individual
eisegesis.

Rafeal puzzles me when he writes:

  "But finally, philosophically speaking,
the clarification of the *how* does not explain
*time* itself."

At issue in this sentence, it seems to me, is the reification of an
abstraction.

In what *sense* should an abstract concept be gratuitously endowed
with a self, with *encasement*, with *embodiment*?

Clearly, molecular biological communication comes encased in symbols
that are meaningfully encased in the *logic* of the natural sciences
- relational symbols that create the essential relations for natural
systems and intervolutionary developments.

To what extent can one *substitute* the *languaging* of *time* for
the nature of matter?

Soren's thoughtful post brings several items to the current table:

"I think the underlying philosophical questions are:

1. Can we fit a theory of meaning into the natural sciences as we
know them? Or will we have to consider the human concept of meaning
as a self-hallucination?
2. Do we consider the physical universe to be closed, meaning that
physical causality is all there is in nature. We accept in humans
mental to mental causality, but the mental cannot have any causal
effect on the physical.
this lead to the third basic question:
3. What is the relation between the physical and the
mental-intensional since they either seems to exist in world apart
(Descartes). Is it functionalistic information (based on Shannon or
Wiener's information theories) that is the link?
  Or the mental and the physical is be aspects of the same one reality
(Spinosa) seen from inside and outside. But then somehow there is
mind in nature and we have to leave both a deterministic and a purely
indeterministic view of the physical world."

Soren's first question is understandable in a narrow framework, at
least to me. Does an unstated presupposition lay beneath the
surface? Should a philosophy of meaning search for a universal
explication of meaning in the sense that physical theories assert
universality? Or, as is common in the natural sciences, should the
meaning of a signal depend on the pre-existing relations between two
systems? Under what circumstances would a natural or technical
language support a universal theory of meaning? Would a theory of
communication that supports normal human behavior suffice as a
theory of communication? (In politics, they sometimes refer to the
fear, "Do not let the perfect spoil the good".)

Soren's second question is phrased once again in physical terms and
effectively excludes chemistry and biology. I spent several years
researching the development of drugs (chemical agents) for therapy
for epilepsy. Mathematically, chemical causality is fundamentally
different from physical causality. It is an observable fact that
human mentation is generated by biochemical processes within the
central nervous system. No such relation with physical abstractions
is known despite the numerous hypotheses. The path dependency from
physical logic to mental logic must pass through chemical logic, or
are other alternatives available?

Soren's third question is once again focused on physical philosophies
that have not been extended to living systems. By setting such
questions in terms of the extremes of abstraction, does one
unintentionally exclude the evolutionary or intervolutionary facts
that generate a stepwise historical progression from the simple to
the perplex?

Soren's view that:

"That will also give a slightly different view on mathematics. It is
not existing in nature by itself as such, but it appears as a
semiotic process in evolution in the emergence of mind."
 
is close to my own. Indeed, is this not close to what is meant by abstraction?
Is this not what is meant by separating the community's exegesis of
external world of reality from individual eisegesis of an internal
world?
I hasten to add that Soren's view perplexifies the nature of
information and indeed of evolution itself. Why? Because now
intervolutionary theory must explicate the generating sources of
mathematics itself (and other abstractions, such as space and time)
in addition to biological intervolution.

Pedro's contribution was informative as usual. I would only caution
that the metaphor of weaving,
 
"The info 'thread' needs to be woven into finer strands in order to
provide those clear responses --and in spite of this conference
advancements we keep the info thread largely into the state of
'bundle' yet."

was explored vigorously. It is very picturesque and at times the
metaphor is compelling. But, the practical utility of introducing
the weaving metaphor has not been demonstrated. Also, is it possible
that we already have the finest-grained structure for information in
the Shannon abstraction and what we seek are coarser grained theories?

In closing, I am looking forward to a busy semester and do not
anticipate the luxury of responding to posts frequently. I express
my gratitude to Pedro and all the session chairs for making the FIS
conference a stimulating event.

Cheers to all

Jerry LR Chandler

Research Professor
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Studies

>Dear Colleagues:
>
>This email responds to recent discussions and extend my earlier
>remarks. The original email is included below for your reference.
>
>Were the questions I poised not relevant to a theory of information?
>If they are not relevant, then what would be relevant?
>
>One possibility is that the strength of beliefs in entropy as the
>source of material information is so strong that it blocks thinking
>about generic philosophical issues related to science.
>
>If this is the case, can someone "make the case" for entropy - that
>is, systematically list the basic reasons that support the concept
>that entropy can be generalized to cover all possible forms of
>communication / information?
>
>The absence of responses to the questions concerning abstraction
>suggest that the role of abstraction in science, philosophy and
>mathematics should be publicly examined by this group. The nature
>of abstraction is fundamental to trans disciplinary discussions.
>Does anyone have a better suggestion on how to open the possibility
>of moving from eisegesis to exegesis and theory construction?
>
>Rafael's question:
>So, if I may add an underlying question:
>how do *information* and (Platonic) *idea* relate
>to each other? Are we having a *re-vision* of Platonic
>thought? if so, where are the differences
>
>illustrates one of the problems with language. In so far as the
>word "information" is derived from the root "form", one can not
>totally ignore the potential role of Platonic thought. But, will
>this aid us in theory building? Indeed, if we can not move from
>eisegesis to exegesis, can philosophy play a role?
>
>Clearly, philosophers are often skilled at painting a simplifying
>view of nature. But, how are these talents to be directed toward
>exegesis? How are these talents related to generating an intricate
>view of the nature of communication / information?
>
>One area that philosophers could potentially contribute to is coding
>theory. What is the common meaning of encoding and decoding and how
>are systems distinguished by their encoding capacities? What are
>the sources of motion that generate encodings? What are the path
>dependencies that support encoding operations? Explication is
>needed, not merely explanation.
>
>The narratives of process philosophers (such as Whitehead) are often
>illuminating when applied to biological dynamics. Could process
>philosophy become a base for theory building covering the component
>of transmission of information?
>
>Russell's intricate writings on correspondence also provides an
>opportunity for philosophical exegesis. The matching of
>corresponding relations from mathematics to science is powerful. In
>what sense is the non-symmetry of encoding and decoding of human
>communication a form of correspondence? Or, under what
>circumstances can human communication be viewed as a symmetrical
>operation?
>
>Tarski's logic is obviously relevant to any many layered (eg,
>complex) associative relation. Should Tarski's logic be invoked to
>relate various forms of communication? If not, why not?
>
>Finally, a critical area exists which I have been reluctant to
>comment upon. That is, to what extent can we elide our philosophy
>of mathematics? The suggestion that we are faced with a choice
>among set theory, group theory or category theory could be
>rephrased. Each mathematical theory is a choice among a collection
>of rules that describe the species - the specification of the
>theory. In a certain sense, one can talk of "the category of sets",
>or "the category of groups" or even the "category of categories".
>The narrative power of mathematical languages include a tight
>network of relations which promote such usages. The mathematics will
>take care of itself once one has a crisp description of the logic of
>the theory, will it not?
>
>Cheers to All
>
>Jerry LR Chandler
Received on Mon Jan 20 23:37:34 2003