Fwd: Some questions about the nature of informational theories

Dear Colleagues:

This email responds to recent discussions and extend my earlier
remarks. The original email is included below for your reference.

Were the questions I poised not relevant to a theory of information?
If they are not relevant, then what would be relevant?

One possibility is that the strength of beliefs in entropy as the
source of material information is so strong that it blocks thinking
about generic philosophical issues related to science.

If this is the case, can someone "make the case" for entropy - that
is, systematically list the basic reasons that support the concept
that entropy can be generalized to cover all possible forms of
communication / information?

The absence of responses to the questions concerning abstraction
suggest that the role of abstraction in science, philosophy and
mathematics should be publicly examined by this group. The nature of
abstraction is fundamental to trans disciplinary discussions. Does
anyone have a better suggestion on how to open the possibility of
moving from eisegesis to exegesis and theory construction?

Rafael's question:
So, if I may add an underlying question:
how do *information* and (Platonic) *idea* relate
to each other? Are we having a *re-vision* of Platonic
thought? if so, where are the differences

illustrates one of the problems with language. In so far as the word
"information" is derived from the root "form", one can not totally
ignore the potential role of Platonic thought. But, will this aid us
in theory building? Indeed, if we can not move from eisegesis to
exegesis, can philosophy play a role?

Clearly, philosophers are often skilled at painting a simplifying
view of nature. But, how are these talents to be directed toward
exegesis? How are these talents related to generating an intricate
view of the nature of communication / information?

One area that philosophers could potentially contribute to is coding
theory. What is the common meaning of encoding and decoding and how
are systems distinguished by their encoding capacities? What are the
sources of motion that generate encodings? What are the path
dependencies that support encoding operations? Explication is
needed, not merely explanation.

The narratives of process philosophers (such as Whitehead) are often
illuminating when applied to biological dynamics. Could process
philosophy become a base for theory building covering the component
of transmission of information?

Russell's intricate writings on correspondence also provides an
opportunity for philosophical exegesis. The matching of corresponding
relations from mathematics to science is powerful. In what sense is
the non-symmetry of encoding and decoding of human communication a
form of correspondence? Or, under what circumstances can human
communication be viewed as a symmetrical operation?

Tarski's logic is obviously relevant to any many layered (eg,
complex) associative relation. Should Tarski's logic be invoked to
relate various forms of communication? If not, why not?

Finally, a critical area exists which I have been reluctant to
comment upon. That is, to what extent can we elide our philosophy of
mathematics? The suggestion that we are faced with a choice among
set theory, group theory or category theory could be rephrased. Each
mathematical theory is a choice among a collection of rules that
describe the species - the specification of the theory. In a certain
sense, one can talk of "the category of sets", or "the category of
groups" or even the "category of categories". The narrative power of
mathematical languages include a tight network of relations which
promote such usages. The mathematics will take care of itself once
one has a crisp description of the logic of the theory, will it not?

Cheers to All

Jerry LR Chandler

>Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2003 17:20:09 -0500
>To: fis@listas.unizar.es
>From: "jlrchand@erols.com" <jlrchand@pop.mail.rcn.net>
>Subject: Some questions about the nature of informational theories
>
>
>
>Dear Colleagues:
>
>Greetings to the New Year.
>Best Wishes to all for a stimulating and productive year.
>
>A very special Thank You to Pedro for his hard work and generous
>contributions in making this web conference an intellectually
>valuable exchange.
>
>In this message, I seek to bring out several critical points that
>deserve, from my point of view, further attention.
>
>As with most good discussions, FIS contributors offer a wide
>spectrum of personal, philosophical and scientific view points. How
>can these individual strands be woven into the fabric of a theory of
>information?
>
>I choose to poise questions in four areas concerning a potential theory:
>1. related basic concepts
>2. roles of abstractions in transmission between systems
>3. qualities of social transmissions
>4. durability of informational concepts.
>
>For precedence, it is of critical importance to look at the theories
>of time, of force, of space, etc and ask: to what extent can these
>individual theories be separated from natural language and how
>successful are these terms translated among disciplines?
>
>For example:
>How is absolute Newtonian time related to biological time?
>
>How is the physical concept of force related to social or political force?
>
>How is a mathematical notion of "space" related to the concept of
>mental space?
>
>After one has seriously addressed these preceding questions, then
>one can ask: What is a reasonable expectation for the concept of
>information?
>
>What are the common features of all forms of information?
>One common feature is the possibility of transmission from one
>system to another.
>Do any other common features encase the concept of information?
>In particular, what is the role of encoding?
>Is encoding an encasement of information?
>If encoding is to be taken as an encasement of information,
>then, what are the logical restrictions on the encoding?
>Is encoding necessarily an abstraction?
>If so, is intracellular communication an abstraction?
>And, if intracellular communication IS AN ABSTRACTION,
>what system is generating the abstraction?,
>what is the nature of the transmission of the abstraction? and
>what is the nature of the system that decodes the abstraction?
>
>From a chemical perspective, one can view chemical metabolism and
>chemical genetics as chemical observables - experimental sciences.
>Are the chemical sciences an abstraction in the same sense that
>mathematics is an abstraction?
>
>If we contrast Shannon information with chemical information, how do
>we go about creating isomorphisms between the transmitting
>processes? What is the nature of the tensions of contrasting an
>abstraction (Shannon information) with a physical or chemical
>process?
>
>Social information, by its very nature, requires the participation
>of two or more individuals. In turn, individual members of a
>society are socially and culturally unique - each with an individual
>trajectory. Each individual trajectory is grounded in heritable
>derivations from parents and socially heritable habits from the
>encasing culture. This suggests, when placed in the context of
>human will and human motivations, that social information places
>special requirements on both the encoding system that generates the
>transmission and the interpreter? Is it necessary to encase the
>generative qualities of the individuals who contribute to the nature
>of the abstraction transmitted? If so, how should these be
>abstracted?
>Can we imagine an encasement of human qualities such that the pure
>logic of mathematical thought is sustained? And transmitted? And
>preserved for years? decades? centuries?
>
>This leads directly to the question of the durability of information.
>Is information "the same" for all time and place?
>Or, is information metastable?
>More precisely:
>Is the concept of information more stable than Newtonian laws?
>Is the concept of information more stable than the genetic code?
>Is the Shannon conceptualization of information the only possible
>basis of higher forms of information?
>If additional forms of information are possible, will they be more
>or less stable than Shannon information?
>What if additional forms of information can not be placed in the
>same mathematical encasement as the Shannon mathematics of
>information?
>A priori, will the new forms of information be metastable with
>respect to Shannon's mathematics?
>A priori, will the new forms of information be metastable with
>respect to the genetic code?
>If a new form of information was created that exceeded the
>metastability of both Shannon information and genetic information,
>what would be its philosophical source? Mathematics? Physics?
>Chemistry? Biology? Philosophy? Religion?
>
>
>Happy New year to All!
>
>Jerry LR Chandler
Received on Fri Jan 10 05:35:37 2003