Re: [Fis] A definition of Information

Dear Stan

The problem I am raising is that according to Peirce pure feeling as
Firstness is there from the beginning and as such internally in matter
and energy - and so is the law of mind. But you seem to build up the
hierarchy in a fairly physicalistic way.

"Stanley N. Salthe" wrote:
>
> Søren: Replying top Søren:
>
> >Dear Stan
> >Where is pure feeling in your scheme? How does first person experience arise?
> SS: Note that in the specification hierarchy, one moves from the most
> generally present realm to the most particular: {found everywhere
> {{restricted to biology {further restricted to some particular human
> culture {{restricted to one particular individual -- what I usually refer
> to as 'psychology'}}}}}}. So, a person arises as a member of all of these
> classes, going from being at first a purely physical embodiment as a
> material gradient in an egg cell all the way in its development to a
> person, as in {gradient in egg cell {fertilized egg cell {embryo {fetus
> {baby {adult}}}}}}, all the while becoming more and more definite and
> individuated. Where feeling emerges I would not be able to say at this
> point.
>
> >Why is that not important for saying that something is an interpretation
> >and therefore generating an interpretant and making a difference or
> >constraint a sign?
> SS: If one is a pansemiotician, it is not necessary to be restricted
> to human individuals in discussing semiosis.
>
> >You think that the theory that you have outlined now fits into John
> >Deely's framework and developing the physical, chemical and informational
> >part that he has only worked on very abstractly not going into present day
> >science? Because then I think you do need to have an opinion on this stuff.
> SS: OK. I am just trying to carry forward the pansemiotic viewpoint.
> At present it has not developed very far I must admit.
>
> >This is where the alternative to modern mechanistic and even informational
> >science comes in - in my opinion.
> SS: Yes, I agree with this. Natural science could not take up
> semiotics without becoming radically transformed from its current
> mechanicism.
>
> >There are many attempts to make consciousness science or theories on an
> >informational scientific basis. I fail to see how they can ever come up
> >with a theory for first person experience.
> SS: You may be right. My above treatment of the individual as the
> innermost subclass in the specification hierarchy might be criticized by
> claiming that all of the other subclasses refer to kinds, not to particular
> indviduals, and so, how can an individual be introduced in the central
> subclass. My answer is that the individual as represented there is
> actually not being taken for a true individual, but a class of socially
> defined roles -- father, brother, engineeer, poet, middle aged person,
> etc., etc. all located simultaneously at one restricted locale.
>
> >This is where the waters part in my opinion. Can we give a solution to the
> >problem of life, first person experience and defining meaning without
> >changing frame work.
> SS: Possibly not. The above hierarchical understanding is an
> externalist construction. For what you are looking for I think we need to
> construct an internalist understanding. Koichiro Matsuno and I, among a
> few others, have begun working on this.
>
> STAN
>
> It seem that you agree with me in that the changing of frame work is
> necessary. But where is it that yours differ form mine or others? Or what
> problems is that you think has not been solved or you are strugling with?
> >>
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "Stanley N. Salthe" <ssalthe@binghamton.edu>
> >Date: Saturday, February 28, 2004 0:19 am
> >Subject: Re: [Fis] A definition of Information
> >
> >> Replying to S¯ren's interesting questions, see interleavings:
> >>
> >> >Dear Stan
> >> >Then I did get it right the first time. My question is again how this
> >> >view fits with being a pansemiotician
> >> SS: One relevant approach would be to look at how the different
> >> semioses as outlined by John Deely relate to each other:
> >> {physiosemiosis{chemosemiosis {biosemiosis {anthroposemiosis}}}}.
> >> Each level of semiosis
> >> emerges from the more generally present one to its left. In a big
> >> picture,each one to the right could be seen to be an interpretant
> >> generated by the
> >> one to its left.
> >>
> >> >, and how you see it fitting with a Peircean semiotic evolutionary
> >> >philosophy.
> >> >In other words where is mind and meaning?
> >> SS: Following Peirce, we can have {Universal Mind {inorganic
> >> realm{organic realm {biological realm {human cognitive realm}}}}}.
> >> Each realm
> >> is an intensification of the prior one (the subclass to its left).
> >>
> >> >I presume that when you talk of energy you are using
> >> >standard physical language.
> >> SS: Yes. As in the prior message below.
> >>
> >> >So how does energy, information and
> >> >semiotics fit together in a theory of FIS in your framework.
> >> SS: Information would generally be any restriction or
> >> constraint on
> >> variety or possibilities. Meaning emerges from such restrictions
> >> when a
> >> system of interpretance generates interpretants on the basis of such
> >> restriction. A system of interpretance can be any system (abiotic or
> >> biotic) that can modify its form or behavior after encountering a
> >> constraint in its environment. I have elaborated on these things in
> >> Semiotica 120:381-394; 127: 481-495, 134:359-380.
> >>
> >> Do you have
> >> >a coherent and internal consistent theory developed?
> >> SS: I would say rather that I am working on it.
> >>
> >> STAN
> >> >
> >> >"Stanley N. Salthe" wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> Replying again to S¯ren:
> >> >> First, as a model of the intensional complexity of the world, the
> >> >> specification hierarchy; {physical world {material world
> >> {biological world
> >> >> {{{etc.}}} shows that energy is the primary, and primal, stuff
> >> in the
> >> >> world, out of which all else comes. So it is in the most
> >> general category.
> >> >> The material world generates friction and delay = entropy, and
> >> so entropy
> >> >> is not as foundational as energy, as we can see by {energy {entropy
> >> >> {{{etc.}}}. But entropy would be foundational with respect to
> >> biology>> because the informational constraints found in genetic
> >> information are
> >> >> historical in origin, and history is just a record of the
> >> results of
> >>> >> friction and delays. So: {energy {entropy {history {etc}}}.
> >> The etc. here
> >> >> could be read as human cultural discourse. This could be
> >> summarized as
> >> >> 'story telling'. Then we would have {energy {entropy {history
> >> {story>> telling}}}}.
> >> >>
> >> >> STAN
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
>
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-- 
Venlig hilsen/Best wishes Søren Brier
Handelshøjskolen København/Copenhagen Business School
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