Re: [Fis] Materialism vs. Idealism

re Michael's posting: I agree with him that information theory deals with
material carriers of information. As a believer in intuition and "psychic
phenomena", I think it mistaken to try to include knowledge obtained
through such channels (and also via the quantum vaccuum, if any) as
'information'. Material information can lead to (or awaken) knowledge, but
would not be the only source of it. That is, we ought to distinguish
beween knowledge and information. We have many definitions of information,
but I think knowledge has escaped our understanding as yet. And perhaps it
is not even a suitable object for scientific experimentation, as the
failure of the many clumsy attempts (e.g., statistical approaches to
psychic phenomena) to find it experimentally seem to me to imply.

STAN

>Dear Guy and colleagues,
>Thanks for your welcome comments. Metaphysics, if I understand the word,
>refers to that branch of philosophy which attempts to understand the
>fundamental nature of all reality, whether sensible or insensible. I
>believe disciples of metaphysics fall somewhere in between materialists,
>or naturalists, who accept only tangible, visible objects, and
>idealists, who maintain that there is nothing but ideas, or mind, or
>spirit. It sounds like youíre advocating the naturalist view, Guy. I
>suppose, though, that even materialists donít usually reject the
>existence of metaphysics itself.
>I think the ideas discussed in metaphysics are among the most profound
>and interesting in the history of human discourse. And that history goes
>back at least as far as Aristotle, and also includes, surely, Plato,
>Kant and Descartes. I donít think you and I could possibly do justice to
>the seminal, wonderful dialectic framed by those renowned thinkers
>without a great deal of rereading and consideration. These are certainly
>not ideas that have been ignored by our forbears.
>Still, I do believe, as Iíve argued, Guy, that there is, in fact, a
>convergence between thermodynamics and information theory. And that,
>indeed, all information is a property of physical objects; including all
>the information in our brains. But, this does not, Iím convinced, imply
>that everything which exists is observable. It doesnít necessarily
>exclude the existence of an intangible mind or soul, for example, or of
>God, or of insensible mathematics. And I wouldnít label such things
>ìmetaphysical informationî.
>No doubt, when Iím considering a mathematical theorem, there is
>specialized brain activity facilitating my understanding. I suspect that
>the philosophers might say that this activity is not, itself, the
>mathematics. I think Michel made the important point that we all seem to
>have no problem distinguishing a thermodynamic system, say, from our
>mathematical model of it. We may process our perceptions and
>understanding of the system through brain activity, I suppose, but those
>brain responses are not, themselves, the thermodynamic system. And,
>likewise, the neurological function associated with mathematical
>reasoning, is not, itself, mathematics. (I feel very inadequate making
>this argument; I know that the philosophers have offered innumerable,
>superior explanations.)
>But, I am now convinced that the conclusion of the materialists cannot
>follow logically just from the fact that information is a property of a
>physical, perceptible object. Even though the observable nature of
>information may have led to many carefully crafted, assiduously
>researched and annotated, thoughtful arguments. I suspect, without
>having done the research, that there is, by now, a hefty accumulation of
>contemporary publications assessing Landauerís dogma of material
>information upon the metaphysical discussion.
>All these ideas interest me thoroughly, but I canít say Iím able to
>discuss them from a perspective of knowledge of the seminal discourse
>provided for us by eminent philosophers. Still, I think itís a mistake
>to assert that ìif metaphysics exists, then information theory can only
>be a toy model of entropy, at bestî. I suspect you mean that if anything
>exists which is not observable, then my support for Landauerís
>conclusion that all information is physical, must be invalid. Thatís the
>implication I find incorrect, Guy, and I understand that to be the point
>of our disagreement.
>Thanks for your stimulating reply.
>Cordially,
>Michael Devereux
>
>
>
>
>
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Received on Tue May 18 22:16:01 2004