RE: [Fis] Materialism vs. Idealism

Dear Stan and colleagues,

The link between 'knowledge' and 'information' is provided by 'meaning.'
Information can be provided with meaning by a receiving system. Meaning
codifies the information. Knowledge can be considered as codified
meaning.

Information is generated by communication (of whatever is communicated).
Given the substance of the communication, some systems are able to
receive the incoming (Shannon-type) information and to process it, for
example, by providing it with meaning. For example, I can receive your
email messages, but the sound of your words cannot be received through
this list.

Some systems (e.g., human beings) can again communicate this meaning as
information. Meaning is then generated at the level of the social
system. Within this system the further codification of meaning can lead
to discursive knowledge, while within each of the agents personal
knowledge can be stored and made operational. The two types of knowledge
are mutually informing each other.

Otherwise, I disgree with Stan that "information theory deals with
material carriers of information." The mathematical theory of
communication abstracts from the material carriers. However, this theory
can be made useful as a heuristics and a statistics for empirical
theories when one specifies what is communicated in the system of
reference. For example, if the system of reference communicates in terms
of molecules, a biological theory of communication can be specified
which can be studied with the help of the mathematical theory of
communication.

My interest is specifically with meaning-processing systems. It is not
so obvious that the "material carriers" of information matter in this
case. For example, we are able to communicate the same contents on paper
or electronically.

With kind regards,

Loet

  _____

Loet Leydesdorff
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
 <mailto:loet@leydesdorff.net> loet@leydesdorff.net ;
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/> http://www.leydesdorff.net/

 
 <http://www.upublish.com/books/leydesdorff-sci.htm> The Challenge of
Scientometrics ; <http://www.upublish.com/books/leydesdorff.htm> The
Self-Organization of the Knowledge-Based Society

> -----Original Message-----
> From: fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es
> [mailto:fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N. Salthe
> Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2004 11:36 PM
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Materialism vs. Idealism
>
>
> re Michael's posting: I agree with him that information
> theory deals with material carriers of information. As a
> believer in intuition and "psychic phenomena", I think it
> mistaken to try to include knowledge obtained through such
> channels (and also via the quantum vaccuum, if any) as
> 'information'. Material information can lead to (or awaken)
> knowledge, but would not be the only source of it. That is,
> we ought to distinguish beween knowledge and information. We
> have many definitions of information, but I think knowledge
> has escaped our understanding as yet. And perhaps it is not
> even a suitable object for scientific experimentation, as the
> failure of the many clumsy attempts (e.g., statistical
> approaches to psychic phenomena) to find it experimentally
> seem to me to imply.
>
> STAN
>
> >Dear Guy and colleagues,
> >Thanks for your welcome comments. Metaphysics, if I understand the
> >word, refers to that branch of philosophy which attempts to
> understand
> >the fundamental nature of all reality, whether sensible or
> insensible.
> >I believe disciples of metaphysics fall somewhere in between
> >materialists, or naturalists, who accept only tangible, visible
> >objects, and idealists, who maintain that there is nothing
> but ideas,
> >or mind, or spirit. It sounds like youíre advocating the naturalist
> >view, Guy. I suppose, though, that even materialists donít usually
> >reject the existence of metaphysics itself. I think the
> ideas discussed
> >in metaphysics are among the most profound and interesting in the
> >history of human discourse. And that history goes back at
> least as far
> >as Aristotle, and also includes, surely, Plato, Kant and
> Descartes. I
> >donít think you and I could possibly do justice to the seminal,
> >wonderful dialectic framed by those renowned thinkers
> without a great
> >deal of rereading and consideration. These are certainly not
> ideas that
> >have been ignored by our forbears. Still, I do believe, as
> Iíve argued,
> >Guy, that there is, in fact, a convergence between
> thermodynamics and
> >information theory. And that, indeed, all information is a
> property of
> >physical objects; including all the information in our brains. But,
> >this does not, Iím convinced, imply that everything which exists is
> >observable. It doesnít necessarily exclude the existence of an
> >intangible mind or soul, for example, or of God, or of insensible
> >mathematics. And I wouldnít label such things ìmetaphysical
> >informationî. No doubt, when Iím considering a mathematical theorem,
> >there is specialized brain activity facilitating my understanding. I
> >suspect that the philosophers might say that this activity is not,
> >itself, the mathematics. I think Michel made the important
> point that
> >we all seem to have no problem distinguishing a
> thermodynamic system,
> >say, from our mathematical model of it. We may process our
> perceptions
> >and understanding of the system through brain activity, I
> suppose, but
> >those brain responses are not, themselves, the thermodynamic system.
> >And, likewise, the neurological function associated with mathematical
> >reasoning, is not, itself, mathematics. (I feel very
> inadequate making
> >this argument; I know that the philosophers have offered innumerable,
> >superior explanations.) But, I am now convinced that the conclusion
> >of the
> materialists cannot
> >follow logically just from the fact that information is a
> property of a
> >physical, perceptible object. Even though the observable nature of
> >information may have led to many carefully crafted, assiduously
> >researched and annotated, thoughtful arguments. I suspect, without
> >having done the research, that there is, by now, a hefty
> accumulation of
> >contemporary publications assessing Landauerís dogma of material
> >information upon the metaphysical discussion. All these ideas
> >interest me thoroughly, but I canít say Iím able to discuss them from
> >a perspective of knowledge of the seminal discourse provided for us
> >by eminent philosophers. Still, I think itís
> a mistake
> >to assert that ìif metaphysics exists, then information
> theory can only
> >be a toy model of entropy, at bestî. I suspect you mean that
> if anything
> >exists which is not observable, then my support for Landauerís
> >conclusion that all information is physical, must be
> invalid. Thatís the
> >implication I find incorrect, Guy, and I understand that to
> be the point
> >of our disagreement.
> >Thanks for your stimulating reply.
> >Cordially,
> >Michael Devereux
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
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>
>
>
>
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Received on Wed May 19 08:21:56 2004