Re: [Fis]: Re: CONSILIENCE: When separate inductions jump together

From: Stanley N. Salthe <ssalthe@binghamton.edu>
Date: Sun 26 Sep 2004 - 23:43:40 CEST

Michel said:

>When Boltzmann proposed a model to compute the Clausius entropy,
>he created a bridge between two worlds: the "micro" and the "macro"
>Undoubtly this was a major victory of science. It linked also
>two areas of science, relatively to the approximate classification
>of disciplines in vigor at the end of the 19th century. Now the
>intersection of the two disciplines is recognized as a full
>subdiscipline: statistical mechanics (it's a fun that the name
>evokes statistics and mechanics but not chemistry). The main
>point here about entropy is that we refer to only one concept:
>a measurable parameter, and its calculation from a physical model.
>The situation is different after 1948, when Shannon picked
>the entropy word and used it in communication sciences.
>Despite the formal similarity in the equations, entropy
>exists now as a mathematical concept outside any reference to
>thermodynamics (except historically). E.g. you can compute
>the entropy of some distribution you like, even if it makes
>sense in a context far from thermodynamics or statistical
>mechanics. Going back to the consilience viewed by Whewell,
>or by Wilson, I would agree with you, Malcolm, that there is
>a danger to count entropy as an example of consilience:
>owing from what I have read about the term (but I am not an
>expert), it seems abusive to exhibit an example of consilience
>when a (meaningless) formal analogy is found somewhere.
>Ihe historical motivation of Shannon to choose the term entropy
>is neglected here: it adds confusion to the debate.

     Since Michel raised the entropy problem here once more, I will propose
a consilience concerning it by sharing a short paper of mine (General
Systems Bulletin 32:5-12, 2003), which gives my view on the evolution of
concepts as well.

STAN

Entropy: What does it really mean?
S.N. Salthe

Analytical Preliminary
     Systematicity is a concept. Concepts are systems. In my view,
concepts are never fully circumscribed by explicit definitions. As
different definitions of the same phenomenon accrue, it could even turn out
that the historically first attempt at one winds up a "standard deviation"
away from the "intersection" of all versions of a concept. Some might say
that this shows that a concept evolves. I follow Foucault (1972) in seeing
instead a gradual clarification of a concept that was only roughly
adumbrated at first. That is, I see a development of its meaning, which
therefore must be fixed from the beginning in a system, or ecology, of
society-specific concepts. Fixed, but vague. The definitions we prefer in
science are supposed to be explicit and crisp, so that they may be made
operational when mediated by equations. But each of these may be somewhat
of a falsification of the actual idea, which, if it gives rise to several
definitions, must be richer, and vaguer. Here I will seek the full meaning
of entropy by examining its four major manifestations in modern science:
Carnot's entropie (Carnot 1824 / 1960); Boltzmann's most probable
condition, S, usually interpreted as disorder (Boltzmann, 1886 / 1974);
Prigogine's delta S, or change in entropy (Prigogine, 1955); and Shannon's
H, or information carrying capacity (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). The
"intersection" of these definitions would be close to the real meaning of
entropy -- but can it be stated explicitly in words?

     First we examine:
(1) The Carnot-Clausius entropy -- entropie -- which could be defined as a
measure of the negefficiency of work. Its production increases as the rate
of work, or power, increases above the rate at greatest energy efficiency
for the dissipative system involved. It is commonly estimated in actual
cases by the heat energy transferred from an available gradient to the
environment as a result of doing work. I believe that, more generally,
other waste products produced during consumption of an energy gradient
should be taken (since they are of lesser energy quality than the original
gradient) to be part of the entropy produced by the work, along with the
heat generated. For an obvious example, sound waves emanating from some
effort or event are not likely to be able to be tapped as an energy
gradient before being dissipated. Nor would the free energy emanating from
a natural open fire (here we have at least one exception -- the opening of
pine cones in trees adapted to fire disclimaxes). So,I suggest that all
energy gone from a gradient, and not accounted for by what is considered to
be the work done by its consumer after some time period, should be taken as
entropic, if not as entropy itself, which is usually held to be represented
only by the completely disordered energy produced by frictions resisting
the work. That is, any diminution of energy from a gradient during its
utilization for work that cannot be accounted for by that work would be
interpreted as part of its dissipation. This approach seems to me to
follow from Boltzmann's interpretation of entropy as disorder (see below)
since the lesser gradients produced are relatively disordered from the
point of view of the consumer responsible for producing them (again, see
below). This approach would also allow us in actual cases to use gradient
diminution as a stand in for the entropy produced, given that we know the
amount of energy that went into work (the exergy).
     This aspect of the entropy concept -- also called physical entropy --
has traditionally been constructed so as to refer exclusively to
equilibrium conditions in isolated systems. Only in those conditions might
it be estimated, from the increase in ambient temperature after work has
been done. Hence one hears that entropy is a state function defined only
for equilibrium conditions in isolated systems. This stricture follows
from entropie's technical definition as a change in heat from one state to
another in an isolated system when the change in state is reversible (i.e.,
at equilibrium, irrespective of the path taken to make the change). The
present approach takes this as an historico- pragmatic constraint on the
physical entropy concept making it applicable to engineering systems, and
therefore, from the point of view of seeking the broader meanings of the
concept, merely one attempt among others.
     One point to note about the engineering version is that entropy is
therein measured as a change in temperature divided by the average
temperature of the system prior to the new equilibrium. This means that a
given production of heat in a warmer system would represent less entropy
increase than the same amount produced in a cooler system. Thus, while
hotter systems are greater generators of entropy, cooler ones are more
receptive to its accumulation.
     Since the production of entropy during work can theoretically be
reduced arbitrarily near to almost none by doing the work increasingly
slowly (up to the point where it becomes reversible), physical entropy is
the aspect of the entropy concept evoked by the observation that haste
makes waste. Of course, it is also the aspect of the concept evoked by the
fact that all efforts of any kind in the material world meet resistance,
(which generates friction, which dissipates available energy as heat).

(2) The Boltzmann (or statistical) entropy, S, which is generally taken to
be the variety of possible states, any one of which a system could be found
to occupy upon observing it at random. This is often called the degree of
disorder of a system. It is usually inferred to imply that, at
equilibrium, any state contributing to S in a system could be reached with
equal likelihood from any other state, but this is not the only
possibility, as it has been pointed out that the states might be governed
instead by a power law (Tsallis entropy). In principle, S, a global state
of a system, spontaneously goes to a maximum in any isolated system, as
visualized in the physical process of free diffusion. However, since it is
an extensive property, it may decline locally providing that a compensating
equal or greater increase occurs elsewhere in the system. At global
equilibrium such local orderings would naturally occur as fluctuations, but
would be damped out sooner or later unless some energetic reinforcement
were applied to preserve them.
     This aspect of the entropy concept establishes one of its key defining
features -- that, in an isolated system, if it changes it is extremely
likely to increase because, failing energy expenditure to maintain them, a
system's idiosyncratic, asymmetrical, historically acquired configurations
would spontaneously decay toward states more likely to be randomly
accessed. This likelihood is so great that it is often held that S must
increase if it changes. We may note in this context that, as a
consequence, heat should tend to flow from hotter to cooler areas (which it
does), tending toward an equilibrium lukewarmness. This would be one
example of a general principle that energy gradients are unstable, or at
best, metastable, and will spontaneously dissipate as rapidly as possible
under most boundary conditions. Entropie in the narrow(est) sense would
be assessed by the heat produced during such dissipation when it is
assisted by, or harnessed to, some (reversible) work.
     But, then, will the negefficiency of work also spontaneously increase?
Or, under what circumstances must it increase? With faster work; but also
with more working parts involved in the work. Therefore, as a system
grows, it should tend to become less energy efficient, and so grow at
increasingly slower specific (per unit) rates. This is born out by
observations on many kinds of systems (Aoki, 2001). But then, must
dissipative systems grow? It seems so (Salthe, 1993; Ulanowicz, 1997).
This is one mode by which they produce entropie, which they must do.
     Boltzmann's interpretation of physical entropy as disorder assumes
major importance in the context of the Big Bang theory of cosmogony,
because that theory has the Universe producing, by way of its accelerating
expansion, extreme disequilibrium universally. This means among other
things, that there will be many energy gradients awaiting demolition, as
matter is the epitome of non-equilibrial energy. This disequilibrium would
be the cause of the tendency for S to spontaneously increase (known as the
Second Law of thermodynamics), as by, e,g., wave front spreading and
diffusion. Note again that the engineering model of physical entropy has
entropy increasing more readily (per unit of heat produced) in cooler
systems. This suggests that the cooling of the universe accompanying its
expansion has increased the effectiveness of the Second Law even as the
system's overall entropy production must have diminished as it cooled.
Note also that one of the engineering limitations on the entropy concept
can be accommodated very nicely in this context by making the -- not
unreasonable, perhaps even necessary -- assumption that the universe is an
isolated system (but, of course, not at equilibrium, at least locally,
where we observers are situated).
     Statistical entropy, S, is the aspect of the entropy concept evoked by
the observation that, failing active preservation, things tend to fall
apart, or become disorderly, as well as the observation that warmth tends
to be lost unless regenerated (a point of importance to homeotherms like
us).

 (3) Next we consider the Prigogine (1955) change in entropy, delta S, of a
local system, or at some locale. Delta S may be either positive or
negative, depending upon relations between S production within a system
(which, as the vicar of the Second Law in nonequilibrial systems, must
always be positive locally within an isolated system), and S flow through
the system. In general, because of fluctuations, a local system would not
be equilibrated even within global equilibrium conditions. So, if more
entropy flows out of a system than is produced therein because some is
incoming and flowing through as well, then delta S would be negative, and
the system would be becoming more orderly (negentropic), as when a
dissipative structure is self-organizing. This can be the case when the
internal work done by a system (producing entropy during work while
consuming an energy gradient) results in associated decreases in other
embodied free energies (which decreases also produce entropy, but not from
the gradient powering the work), followed by most of the entropy flowing
out (as heat and waste products of lesser energy quality than the
precursors). More generally, if entropy flows through a system, and some
is produced therein as well, then more would tend to flow out than was
produced internally (if the system remains intact), and so its entropy
change would be negative. In this case, the system would be maintaining
itself despite taking in entropy (as, e.g., heat, buffeting, toxins and
free radicals), which could have disrupted it. The work done internally
maintains the system. Note that this gives us the simplest model of a
dissipative structure. In it, a managed flow of entropy intruding from
outside the system is a necessary condition to allow the entropy produced
inside (during the work of entropy management), when added to that flowing
through, to promote self-organization. That is, a flow through of entropy
is a necessary prerequisite for self -organization. This is crucial for
understanding the origin of life. A proto living system must therefore be
located within a larger scale dissipative structure, driven by its flows.
When such a protosystem finds a way to temporarily manage impinging
disorder, it can self-organize into a system that, by producing its own
disorder from available gradients during internal work, comes to be able to
more effectively manage impinging disorder by way of the forms produced by
that internal work.
     Delta S is an extensive property of a given locale or subsystem within
a system wherein, globally, S must increase. I take much of delta S to
represent local changes in internal free energy, but it could also signal
changes in system / energy gradient negefficiency by way of configurational
alterations in the work space, or, put in a more Prigoginean way, changes
in energy flows relative to the forces focused from the energy gradients
being consumed.
     The necessity for positive local entropy production in a dissipative
structure is the aspect of the entropy concept evoked by the observation
that one has to keep "running" (producing entropy internally and shipping
it out) in order just to maintain oneself as is. Or, that making and
maintaining a system is always taxed by having to expend some available
energy on entropy -- which, of course connects to the observation, relative
to entropie, that all efforts meet resistance.
     It has been pointed out to me that the units of delta S are different
from those of entropie. Here is a good place to remind the reader that I
am seeking vaguer definitions. I seek a concept that would define both a
substance and its changes, being vaguer than both, as in {basic concept
{substance {changes in substance}}}.

(4) Finally there is the Shannon, or informational, entropy, H, which is
the potential variety of messages that a system might mediate (its capacity
for generating variety), or more generally, the uncertainty of system
behavior. The exact mathematical form of H is identical to that of S, but
with physical constraints removed, thereby generalizing it. Thus, {H {S
}}. That is, physical entropy, when interpreted statistically as disorder
(S), is a special kind of entropy compared to informational entropy.
Disorder in the physical sense is just the variety of configurations a
system can be observed to take over some standard time period, or {variety
{disorder }} = {variety per se {variety of accessed physical
configurations}}. Note that one of the added constraints at the enclosed
level here is that disorder will spontaneously increase, so we might better
have written 'disordering' as in {variety {disorder {disordering }}.
     It is often asserted that physical entropy in the negefficiency sense
(entropie) has nothing whatever to do with H. In my view, negefficiency
measures the lack of fittingness between an energy gradient and its
consumer, and therefore must be informational in character. That is, as
negefficiency increases, the lack of information about its gradient in a
consumer is increasing, and therefore the unreliability of their 'fit' must
increase. This means that as a gradient is dissipated increasingly
rapidly, the information a system has concerning its use to do work,
embodied in its forms and/or behavior, becomes increasingly uncertain in
effect. Since natural selection is working on systems most intensely when
they are pushing the envelope (Salthe, 1975), efficiency at faster rates
could evolve via selection in more complex systems, modifying the
information a system has concerning its gradients. But, at whatever rate a
system establishes its maximum efficiency, (a) work rates faster than that
will still become increasingly inefficient, and (b) now slower rates (away
from the reversible range, of course) would be less efficient than the
evolved optimum rate.
     In the Negentropy Principle of Information (NPI) of Brillouin (1956),
information, (I), is just any limitation on H, (with I + H = k), and is
generated by a reduction in degrees of freedom, or by symmetry breaking.
On the other hand, H is also generated out of information, most simply by
permutation of behavioral interactions informed by an array of fixed
informational constraints. I take information to be any constraint on the
behavior of a system, leaving a degree of uncertainty (H) to quantitatively
characterize the remaining capacity of the system for generating behavior,
functional as well as pathological (characteristic as well as unusual).
So, H and I seem to be aspects of some single "substance". I suggest that
this "substance" is configuration, which would be either static (as part of
I) or in motion, which, in turn, would be either predictable (assimilable
to I) or not (as H).
      A point of confusion between H and S should be dealt with here. That
is that one must keep in mind the scalar level where the H is imputed to be
located. So, if we refer to the biological diversity of an ecosystems as
entropic, with an H of a certain value, we are not dealing with the fact
that the units used to calculate the entropy -- populations of organisms --
are themselves quite negentropic when viewed from a different level and/or
perspective. More classically, the molecules of a gas dispersing as
described by Boltzmann are themselves quite orderly, and that order is not
supposed to break down as the collection moves toward equilibrium (of
course, this might occur as well in some kinds of more interesting
systems).
     It must be noted that, as a bonafide entropy should, H necessarily
tends to increase within any expanding (e.g., the Big Bang) or growing
system (Brooks and Wiley, 1988), as well as, (Salthe, 1990), in the
environment of any active local system capable of learning about its
environment, including its energy gradients. The variety of an expanding
system's behavior (H) tends to increase toward the maximum capacity for
supporting variety of that kind of system. This may be compared to S, which
tends to increase in any isolated system. I assume the Universe is both
isolated and expanding, and therefore S and H both must tend to increase
within it. H materially increases in the Universe basically because, as it
expands and cools at accelerating rate, some of the increasingly
nonequilibrium energy precipitates as matter. Note that, with information,
(I), tending to produce S by way of mediating work (no work without an
informed system to do it), it does this only by having diminished H, (I = k
- H), so that, when a system does internal work it is, while becoming more
orderly, shedding some of its own internal informational entropy (H) for
externalized physical entropy (S).
     Informational entropy is the aspect of the entropy concept evoked by
the observation that the behavior of more complicated (information rich)
systems (say, a horse) tends to be more uncertain than that of simpler
systems (say, a tractor). This is so, generally, even if a more
complicated system functions with its number of states reduced by
informational constraints, because one needs to add in unusual and even
pathological states to get all of system H, and these should have increased
as the number of functional states was restricted by imposed information.
With its habitual behavioral capacity reduced, a system could appear more
orderly to an observer, who could obtain more information about it.
     As a coda on informational entropy, we should consider whether
Kolmogorov complexity (Kolmogorov,1975) is an entropy. Here, a string of
tokens is complex if it cannot be generated by a simpler string. As it
happens, sequences that cannot be reduced to smaller ones are random
mathematically. More generally, something that cannot be represented by
less than a complete duplicate of itself is random / complex. But is it
"entropic"? Unless it tended irreversibly to replace more ordered
configurations, I would say 'no'. Not everything reckoned random can be an
entropy, even though entropic configurations tend to be randomized. The
entropy concept is best restricted to randomization that must increase
under at least some conditions.

Preliminary Analysis
     Now, is the unpredictability of complicated systems related to the
fact that one needs to keep running just to stay intact, and are these
related to the fact that things have a tendency to disintegrate, and are
these in turn related to the observations (a) that all efforts meet
resistance, and (b) that haste makes waste?
      Put otherwise (and going the other way), is negefficiency related to
disorder and is that related to variety? The question put this way was
answered briefly in the affirmative above (in 4).
     So, we have imperfect links between consumers and energy gradients
mapped to disorder. Of course, the disorder in question is then,
"subjective", in that it can characterize energy gradients only with
respect to particular consumers. Ant eaters can process ants nicely, but
rabbits cannot; steam engines can work with the energy freed by a focused
fire, but elephants cannot. More generally, however, no fit between
gradient and consumer can be perfect. Unless work is being done so slowly
as to be reversible, it is taxed by entropy production. As well, when the
work in question gets hastier and hastier -- and most animals are fast food
processors! -- consumption becomes increasingly deranged, meeting greater
and greater resistance. And, of course, abiotically, the dissipative
structures that get most of a gradient are those that degrade it fastest.
Because these have minimal form to preserve, they are closer to being able
to maximize their rate of entropy production than are living things, which,
hasty withal, still need to preserve their complicated forms. Haste is
imposed upon living systems by the acute need to heal and recover from
perturbations as quickly as possible. They are also in competition for
gradient with others of their own and other kinds, and, as Darwinians tell
us, they are as well in reproductive competition with their conspecifics.
Abiotic dissipative structures can almost maximize their entropy
production, biotics can do so only to an extent allowed by their more
complicated embodiments (of course, all systems can maximize only to an
extent governed by bearing constraints). In any case, I conclude that
disorder causes physical entropy production as well as being, as S, an
indicator of the amount produced.
     The disorder of negefficiency is configurational (even if the
configurations are behavioral and fleeting). And so is Boltzmann's S.
Negefficiency is generated by friction when interacting configurations are
not perfectly fitted, while S is generated by random walks. An orderly
walk would have some pattern to it, and, importantly, could then be
harnessed to do work. Random walks accomplish nothing, reversing direction
as often as not. The link between physical entropy and S is that the
former is generated to the degree that the link between energy gradient and
consumer is contaminated by unanticipated irregularities -- by disorder --
causing resistance to the work being done. Conventionally, S is held to
just indicate the degree of randomness of scattered particles -- a result
of negefficiency. My point is that randomness can be viewed also as the
source of the friction which scatters the particles, as caused by
disorderliness in the configurations of gradient-consumer links. I
conclude that physical entropy is easily mapped to disorder, both as
Boltzmann saw long ago, and in a generative sense as well.
     An important part of Boltzmann's formulation is that S will increase
if it changes -- that is, that disorder will increase -- unless energies
are spent preventing that. While not conventionally thought of in this
way, this is highly likely at all scales. No matter what order is
constructed or discerned by what subjectivity, it will become disordered
eventually, the rate being tailored to the scale of change (this fact is a
major corroboration that the universe we are in must be out of
equilibrium). A sugar cube will become diffused throughout a glass of
water in a period of weeks, while, absent warfare, a building will
gradually collapse over a period of decades, and a forest will gradually
fail to regenerate over a period of eons. And so we can indeed match the
notion that things tend to fall apart unless preserved with the
negefficient notion that all efforts at preservation meet resistance, which
is in turn linked to haste makes waste. And the necessary falling apart
is, of course, easily related to the notion embodied in Prigogine's delta
S, that one must keep running just to stay put. And, of course the harder
one runs, the less efficient is the running! Furthermore, the more
complicated a running system is, the more likely some of its joints will
fluctuate toward being more frictional at any given moment. Furthermore,
because of growth, all systems tend to become more complicated
     The inability to work very efficiently at significant loadings makes
our connection to H, informational entropy. I suggest, as above, that
inefficiency is fundamentally a problem of lack of mutual information
between consumer and energy gradient, a problem that increases with hasty
work as well as with more working parts. It should be noted again that the
acquisition of information by carving it out of possibilities is itself
taxed by the same necessary inefficiency. The prior possibilities are the
embodiment of H, which can be temporarily reduced by the acquisition of
information. As possibilities are reduced, system informational entropy is
exchanged for discarded physical entropy by way of the work involved.
Learning (of whatever kind in whatever system) is subject to the same
negefficiency that restrains all work.
     So, we need a word that signifies a general lack of efficiency,
increasing disorder, and the need to be continually active, with
fluctuating uncertainty. Some word that means at the same time increasing
difficulty, messiness, uncertainty (confusion) and, yes, weariness! That
word is 'entropy'. And I would guess the concept it stands for has still
not been fully excavated.

     I thank John Collier and Bob Ulanowicz for helpful comments on the text.

References
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S.E. Jřrgensen,
     editor. Thermodynamics and Ecological Modelling. Lewis Publishers,
Boca Raton,
     Florida, USA.
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Philosophical
     Problems. D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Brillouin, L. 1962. Science and Information Theory. Academic Press, New York.
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    Biology. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
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American
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Salthe, S.N., 1990. Sketch of a logical demonstration that the global
information
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internally.
     Journal of Ideas 1: 51-56.
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Ulanowicz, R.E., 1997. Ecology, The Ascendent Perspective. Columbia
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     Press, New York.

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