Is FIS in semiotics?

At 03:02 PM 01/07/02, James wrote:
>Hi John:
>
>Yes, I think it sounds like we do kinda agree.
>
>The main reason I introduced the point about enzymes being "fooled" by
>pharmaceutical molecules (and, of course, by many natural ones, as
>well), though, was to emphasize a point that is stressed in the
>philosophical literature on biological functions. That is, that
>normativity is of the essence. That is, for something to count as a
>function in the proper (biological) sense of the word, there is
>something that it is supposed to do, something that it can get either
>right or wrong. In short, the concept of function entails that of
>malfunction (as well as success, or correct function, of course).
>
>I wanted to make this point about function entailing malfunction because
>I believe this is where the roots of "purpose" lie in biology (which you
>were questioning). And insofar as information, properly speaking, must
>be recognized as having a semantic component, and insofar as meaning is
>likewise a normative and teleological concept, then I believe that the
>roots of information lie in this same knot of problems, as well. In
>sum, as I see it, all of our aporiae in theoretical biology revolve
>around the ontological status of purpose and value.

I have been following this discussion with interest. I agree with
this pretty much completely. I now have an observation: the discipline that
deals with the interpretation of signs is called "semiotics" (John Locke,
Inquiry chapter XXI) . Either information theory involves meaning, and has
something useful to say about it, in which case it is a part of semiotics, to
which we should probably turn attention, or it does not, in which case it is
independent. Most approaches to information theory that have recognized
this dilemma have taken the latter route. We, if we wish to decide the
foundations of information science, must make a decision: is information
theory a branch of semiotics, in which case the foundations of information
science are semiotics, or are they independent but interlinked disciplines,
each with their own foundations?

John

 From Locke:

  Chapter XXI
Of the Division of the Sciences

1. Science may be divided into three sorts. All that can fall within the
compass of human understanding, being either, First, the nature of things,
as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation:
or, Secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and
voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness: or,
Thirdly, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the
other of these is attained and communicated; I think science may be divided
properly into these three sorts:-

2. Physica. First, The knowledge of things, as they are in their own proper
beings, their constitution, properties, and operations; whereby I mean not
only matter and body, but spirits also, which have their proper natures,
constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This, in a little more
enlarged sense of the word, I call Phusike, or natural philosophy. The end
of this is bare speculative truth: and whatsoever can afford the mind of
man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, angels,
spirits, bodies; or any of their affections, as number, and figure, &c.

3. Practica. Secondly, Praktike, The skill of right applying our own powers
and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. The most
considerable under this head is ethics, which is the seeking out those
rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means
to practise them. The end of this is not bare speculation and the knowledge
of truth; but right, and a conduct suitable to it.

4. Semeiotike. Thirdly, the third branch may be called Semeiotike, or the
doctrine of signs; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough
termed also Logike, logic: the business whereof is to consider the nature
of signs, the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or
conveying its knowledge to others. For, since the things the mind
contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the
understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or
representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and
these are ideas. And because the scene of ideas that makes one man's
thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor laid up
anywhere but in the memory, a no very sure repository: therefore to
communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own
use, signs of our ideas are also necessary: those which men have found most
convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate sounds. The
consideration, then, of ideas and words as the great instruments of
knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a
view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were
distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort
of logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.

----------
Dr John Collier john.collier@kla.univie.ac.at
Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research
Adolf Lorenz Gasse 2 +432-242-32390-19
A-3422 Altenberg Austria Fax: 242-32390-4
http://www.kli.ac.at/research.html?personal/collier
Received on Tue Jul 9 11:57:45 2002